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ABSTRACT 
In an environment of constrained public budgets and poor service delivery, private sector 
participation through Public Private Partnerships is increasingly being utilised as a vehicle to 
deliver public infrastructure. However, implementation is often problematic with varying 
degrees of success in different countries and sectors. 
To overcome a crippling power supply deficit, the government of Uganda is implementing 
strategies to encourage and incentivise private sector participation in the development of 
hydropower generation facilities. Notwithstanding the sector reforms and government 
commitment, private sector investment is still limited and many proposed projects have not 
materialised. 
Through a literature review this research identifies likely constraints to the successful 
development and implementation of public private partnerships for hydropower projects in 
Uganda drawing on experiences around the world within the energy and other sectors. It then 
establishes the relative importance of these constraints as perceived by stakeholders in the 
Uganda electricity sector through a questionnaire distributed to these stakeholders. Based on 
the survey findings, conclusions are drawn to suggest possible strategies and measures that 
may mitigate these constraints. 
The findings from the survey indicate that the most significant constraint to private sector 
participation was difficulty in obtaining financing, followed by resistance to projects by 
environmental groups. Numerous procedural requirements, bureaucracy involved and 
inexperience of participants were identified as other significant constraints. However, the 
findings showed that the stakeholders generally found the regulatory framework governing 
the sector satisfactory for attracting private sector participation. In addition, a restriction on 
foreign ownership of companies was ranked as the least important of the identified 
constraints. The analysis suggests that to mitigate the constraints, a number of measures 
could be implemented including; training personnel, stringently adhering to environmental 
and social impact assessment processes, the creation of a dedicated PPP unit within the 
government to provide oversight to the PPP project delivery process and finally the 
development of a process map for PPP implementation in the electricity sector. 
The research contributes to an understanding of the constraints to public private partnerships 
in the electricity sector including identifYing the most significant in the Ugandan context In 
addition to this, the research provides valuable insights for developing countries intending to 
or undertaking public private partnerships in the electricity sector. 
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The role adequate and good quality physical infrastructure facilities play in enhancing and 
sustaining economic growth and development including improving the quality of life of a 
country's citizens is undisputed (World Bank, 1994; Sader, 2000; Spoebr et al., 2002; 
Colin et a/., 2004; Van, 2005). Infrastructure is necessary for the movement of goods and 
persons in addition to enabling the delivery of other important social services, such as 
education and health, (World Bank, 1994; UNIDO, 2001). More specifically, adequate 
supply of power has long been identified as being critical to the ability to enhance and 
sustain economic growth (World Bank, 1994) and necessary to meet the demands of 
industry, commerce, domestic use and the movement of goods and people (PDD, 2005). In 
relation to the millennium development goals, in addition to playing a significant role in 
attaining the other goals, access to an environmentally sustainable and modern energy 
supply directly reduces poverty by improving the financial wellbeing of the population 
through increased earnings from an improved quality and range of products (lEA, 2002). 
Traditionally, the responsibility providing and financing the development of infrastructure 
facilities e.g. roads, telecommunication, power and provision of water and sanitation has 
lain under the remit of government (Bennet et al., 1999; Akintoye et al., 2003; Van, 2005) 
In developing countries, the management and provision of electricity has typically hitherto 
been through a vertically integrated state owned utility company responsible for the 
functions of generation, transmission and distribution including investment in the 
development of new facilities. Examples include the Uganda electricity board (DEB) 
(Electricity Act, 1999; Engorait, 2004) and Water and Power Development Authority in 
Pakistan (Fraser, 2005). 
The state control of the electricity sector has been a function of governments' obligation to 
avail social services to the larger population, making the electricity sector highly 
politicised and thus a politically strategic infrastructural service (Henisz, 2002). 
Subsequently, operation of these state utility companies was often highly subsidised from 
the government budget and thus quite often the tariffs to the consumers were not reflective 
of the actual cost of delivery of the service (Blackman et al., 1999; ADB, 2000). However, 
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budgetary constraints faced by governments in developing countries often meant 
inadequate financial support to the state owned utility companies; hampering their 
effective performance, with their operations characterised by poor service delivery (Benoit, 
2005; William et af., 2006) manifested amongst others by frequent power outages, low 
area coverage, high transmission losses and inefficiencies in revenue collection (ADB, 
2000; William et af., 2006). 
In their traditional role, governments in developing countries catered for and financed 
investment in the development of infrastructure facilities including the electricity sector, 
through the government budget and through multilateral and bilateral assistance (Van, 
2005). However the trend of decreasing multilateral and bilateral assistance being provided 
directly to governments (ADB, 2000; Harris, 2003; Chege, 2004; Colin et af., 2004), 
constrained public budgets and the poor service delivery of some state owned utility 
companies, combined with the increasing demand for infrastructural facilities as a result of 
growing populations, has led to a growing role for the private sector in the delivery of 
public infrastructure facilities under collaborative arrangements such as public private 
partnership (PPP's) (Bennet et af., 1999; ADB, 2000; SO, 2000; Ahadzi, 2001; Akintoye et 
af.,2003). 
1.1 Public Private Partnerships 
Public private partnerships are defined as long-term contractual arrangements intended to 
harness the skills and resources of both the private and public sector in the mutual delivery 
of public services or development of public infrastructure (SO, 2000). In practice, there 
are various modes of PPP's including management contracts, service contracts, 
concessions, the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) and Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO) 
modes (Department of Finance 2000; CFMEV, 2006). These have been utilised in a wide 
range of sectors in various countries; e.g. power sector (Wang et af., 1998; Blackman et 
af., 1999; ADB, 2000; Ahadzi et af., 2004; Kumar et af., 2005), housing sector (Rintala, 
2005), education (Gunning et af., 2002), and water sectors (Abdul-Aziz, 2001) 
The pooling together of the resources of the private and public sectors for the delivery of a 
public service or in the development of public infrastructure has a number of advantages 
including access to capital (ADB, 2000; Akintoye et af., 2003; Bing Li et af., 2005), 
increased value for money (SO, 2000), timely completion of projects (Bing Li et af., 2005) 
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and improved service delivery through the use of better management practises and 
adoption of innovative solutions (Chege, 2001; Akintoye et al., 2003). 
To facilitate private sector participation in the electricity sector, many developing countries 
have undertaken structural reforms that have typically involved measures such as; 
unbundling of the existing state owned utility companies into entities of generation, 
transmission and distribution, creation of independent regulatory agencies for the sector, 
and introduction of private sector participation in the provision/delivery of electricity to 
the public (Bennet et al., 1999; ADB, 2000; Colin et al., 2004; William et al., 2006). 
Hence it is anticipated that with increased private sector participation, much needed capital 
will be invested to improve/ construct additional infrastructure facilities to meet the 
growing demand whilst improving service delivery by the adoption of better management 
practices prevalent in the private sector (Blackman et al., 1999; ADB, 2000; lEA, 2003; 
Colin et al., 2004; Benoit, 2005). 
1.2 Constraints on the adoption of PPPs 
Though used widely in a number of sectors and the theoretical advantages put forward for 
its adoption, the development and implementation of public private partnerships has often 
proved to be a challenge with varying levels of success in different sectors and different 
countries. The process has been characterised inter alia by protracted negotiations (Ahadzi 
et al., 2004), difficulties in structuring project financing (Jyoti et al., 1998; ADB, 2000; 
Benoit, 2005) lack of a supportive legal and regulatory framework (Blackman et al., 1999), 
high bidding costs (Akintoye et al., 2003; Bing Li et al., 2005), resistance from 
environmentalists (ADB, 2000; Alison, 2002) and the public (Hall et aI., 2005), due to 
concerns for the environmental impact of proposed projects and increased service costs 
respectively. These constraints have inevitably led to a reduction in private sector interest 
and investment in the provision of infrastructure facilities particularly in developing 
countries where perceptions of risk tend to be more sensitive to these issues than in 
developing countries. 
The challenges and varying levels of success experienced in the development of public 
private partnerships suggests that the institutional environment within which a public 
private partnerships arrangement is implemented plays a significant role in its success or 
failure. 
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Therefore, in order to understand these challenges and propose or devise measures to 
overcome them; it is imperative that the institutional environment within which public 
private partnerships are implemented is examined. The theory of institutions provides a 
useful perspective through which the constraints to the successful development and 
implementation ofPPPs as a contractual arrangement can begin to be understood and what 
or how measures can be developed to overcome them (North, 1990; Ostrom et 01., 1993) 
1.3 The Theory of Institutional Constraints 
North (1999) defines 'institutions' as a framework of formal (e.g. laws, regulations) and 
informal constraints (e.g. customs, taboos); the "rules of the game", that shape social 
political and economic aspects of human interactions. These constraints give rise to a set of 
opportunities and provide incentives for individuals and organisations; the "players in the 
game", to engage in economic activities (North, 1990; Ostrom et 01.,1993). 
Individuals or organisations take advantage of the opportunities ~ted through varying 
contractual arrangements e.g. public private partnerships as determined by the institutional 
environment (North, 1990). Therefore the success of the contractual arrangement is highly 
dependant on the nature of incentives that are put in place for a particular project, or that 
exist in the environment to encourage certain behaviours or, in the same manner, the 
disincentives to discourage certain behaviour embedded within the institution framework 
(North, 1990; Ostrometal., 1993). 
The role these "institutions" play in determining the success of contractual arrangements is 
based on the ability to define and enforce the property rights upon which the contractual 
arrangements are based and the associated transaction costs (North, 1990; Ostrom et 01., 
1993; Furubotn et aI., 1998). Firstly, it is imperative that the institutional environment 
clearly and consistently defines the rights and benefits for the use of an asset i.e. the 
property rights, and that these be recognised and enforceable by members of society. 
Secondly, the transaction costs involved in establishing and enforcing the contractual 
arrangement should not in their own right be so excessive as to discourage an individual or 
organisation from pursuing the transaction(North, 1990; Ostrom et 01.,1993). 
Viewed though the lens of institutional environment, public private partnerships can be 
seen as contractual arrangements that come about in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities arising from the structuring of an institutional environment within a given 
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social and political context. If the desire is to encourage such partnerships, it is important 
that the institutional environment be tailored appropriately so as to meet the expectations 
of the potential participants and investors active in this environment. 
The nature of infrastructure development in the electricity sector is such that it requires 
large initial capital investments; usually undertaken by foreign investors for the case of 
developing countries (Sader, 2000; Lamech et 01., 2003). Furthermore, the return on 
investment is projected over a long period of time ranging from 15 -30 years (Blackman et 
01., 1999; Izzaguire, 2000; Sader, 2000; Lamech et 01., 2003; Colin et 01., 2004; Benoit, 
2005). These factors serve to bring to the forefront the importance of an appropriate 
institutional environment, with a credible and stable regime of property rights in order to 
attract and sustain private sector participation and investment in the electricity sector. It is 
therefore important that the framers of the ''rules of the game" are aware of the 
expectations of the participants in order to establish an appropriate institutional 
environment or improve upon an existing one. Jzzaguire (2000), corroborated by Lamech 
et 01.(2003), identify a mismatch between investment conditions and investors perceptions 
as a cause of the increasing difficulty in attracting private sector participation and 
investment in the provision of much needed critical services such as electric power in 
developing countries. 
The above argument has established that though the use of public private partnership 
arrangements is wide spread, the success of a particular partnership in a given 
infrastructural sector is influenced by the institutional environment within which it is 
implemented. This study's focus is on the development and implementation of public 
private partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector which like a number of other 
developing countries has undertaken structural reforms to encourage private sector 
participation in the sector and is experiencing challenges in this endeavour. 
1.4 Ugandan Context 
Uganda is a developing country located in sub Saharan Africa with a population of 24.4 
million people of which an estimated 88 % live in rural areas. Bilateral and multilateral 
budgetary support in terms of grants and loans accounts for 38% of the country budget for 
the financial year 2007/2008 with the GDP Growth rate at 6.5% (Summa, 2007). In order 
to sustain the economic growth and improve the general standard and quality of living of 
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its people, the government of Uganda in its energy policy 2002 recognise the significant 
role played by an adequate and reliable supply of electricity (MoEMD, 2002). 
To date hydropower generation facilities are the major sources of electricity in Uganda. 
Currently an installed hydropower generation capacity of 317MW supplies 5% of the 
estimated 24 million people and is unable to meet the estimated current peak demand of 
380MW necessitating a rotational rationing of power (MoEMD, 2002). The low level of 
power supply and hence low population coverage flies in the face of the identified potential 
of 2500MW of hydropower capacity on untapped hydro sites located along the numerous 
rivers in the country (World Bank, 2005b).With the increase in energy demand estimated 
to grow at 4-5MW per month and an economy growing at an average rate of 6.3% per 
annum over the last 10 years the need for additional power generation facilities has now 
become critical (Engorait, 2004). 
To overcome the current power supply deficit and simultaneously cater for anticipated 
future demand, the government of Uganda has, in the recent past, promoted strategies to 
encourage and incentivise private sector participation in the development of hydropower 
generation facilities(Electricity Act, 1999; Engorait, 2004). Key to this was an electricity 
sector reform process that led to the unbundling of the previous vertically integrated state 
owned Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), creation of an independent regulatory body: the 
Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), and enacting of the Electricity Act 1999 that 
provided a legal framework and liberalised the electricity sector allowing private sector 
participation (Electricity Act, 1999; Mugyenzi, 2001; Nyirinkindi, 2003; Engorait, 2004; 
GoU, 2004; Mbendi, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the reforms and government commitment, private sector investment is 
still limited and many proposed projects have not materialised. A number of proposed 
public private partnership projects e.g. the development of Bujagali hydropower station 
and Karuma power station have been hampered by accusations of, inter alia; corruption 
(8asha, 2003; World Bank, 2007), protracted negotiations (Government of Uganda, 2004; 
Bbumba, 2006), withdrawal of project developers (Energy Information Administration, 
2004) and difficulties in structuring project financing (Bbumba, 2006). Together this has 
deprived the population and economy from benefiting from an adequate and reliable 
supply of electricity. 
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1.5 Problem formulation 
An adequate and reliable stock of physical infrastructure plays an important role in 
enabling and sustaining socio-economic development in any country (World Bank, 1994; 
Sader, 2000; Spoebr et al., 2002; Colin et al., 2004). In developing countries, this has been 
hampered by inefficiencies and inadequacies in government led service delivery and 
investment (Blackman et al., 1999; ADB, 2000; Benoit, 2005). To overcome these 
handicaps, alternative means involving the private sector through public private 
partnerships have been sought and are being implemented with varying levels of success in 
the different countries and sectors (Bennet et al., 1999; Ye et al., 2000; Ahadzi, 2001; 
Akintoye et al., 2003; Harris, 2003; Ahadzi et al., 2004; Woodhouse, 2005; Zhang, 2005) 
It has been argued that the successful development and implementation of long term 
contractual arrangements like public private partnerships in developing countries is 
dependant on the ability institutions to provide an enabling environment to attract investors 
whilst encapsulating the necessary incentives or disincentives to trigger desired behaviour 
(North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993; Henisz, 2002). Key to this is the ability to demonstrate 
credibility of its property rights regime and reduce the transaction costs involved in 
establishing and enforcing the contracts (North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993; Furubotn et al., 
1998). 
With Uganda being among one of the least developed countries and with its budget being 
highly subsidised by donor support, partnerships with the private sector have been sought 
in order to enable the delivery of the required level of infrastructure development in the 
electricity sector (Electricity Act, 1999) . 
Yet despite undertaking reforms aimed at facilitating private sector investment in the 
electricity sector, private sector participation is still limited with many of the proposed 
projects having failed to materialise to date (Electricity Act, 1999; Mugyenzi, 2001; 
Nyirinkindi, 2003; Government of Uganda, 2004; Bbumba, 2006; Mbendi, 2006). Efforts 
to develop public private partnership projects have been shrouded in accusations of 
corruption (Sasha, 2003; World Bank, 2007), long negotiation periods and investor 
withdrawals (ADB, 2000; GoU, 2004; Bbumba, 2006; Energy Information Administration, 
2004). Issues that have similarly cropped up in similar initiatives in other developing 
countries (Blackman etal., 1999; ADB, 2000; Fraser, 2005; Woodhouse, 2005). 
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Therefore, having identified public private partnerships as significant interventions in the 
efforts to increase the hydropower generation capacity in the Uganda electricity sector in 
order to overcome the current power shortage whilst developing capacity to meet future 
demand, it is imperative that lessons are drawn from the experiences thus far to enable the 
identification of measures and strategies to smoothen the development and implementation 
of these corroborative ventures between the public and private sectors. 
1.6 Research problem 
Despite the increasing popularity of Public private partnerships for delivery of public 
physical infrastructure both in terms of countries undertaking them and the sectors 
involved, their successful implementation is still a challenge with various impediments 
causing a disparity in the level of success within the different countries and sectors. This 
disparity has been attributed to constraints arising from inadequacies of the institutional 
environment, the nature of incentives or disincentives embedded therein and the influence 
these have on the stakeholders. 
Therefore in order to develop strategies to facilitate the successful development and 
implementation of public private partnership projects for hydropower generation facilities 
in the Uganda electricity sector, it is necessary to identify potential constraints and their 
relative importance as perceived by stakeholders involved in the development and 
implementation of public private partnership projects for hydropower generation facilities 
in the Uganda electricity sector. This would enable the exploration of measures or 
strategies to mitigate the constraints. 
1.6.1 Resl!llrch questions 
Thus the principle research question can be summarised as follows: 
How can the delivery of Hydropower generation facilities through Public Private 
Partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector be enhanced? 
The following subsidiary research questions flow from this principle research question 
1. What are the constraints that inhibit the successful realisation of public private 
partnership arrangements for the development of Hydropower generation facilities? 
2. How do the constraints affect the development of Public Private Partnerships? 
3. How can the constraints be addressed? 
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106.2 Hypothesis 
Institutional bottlenecks are constraining the uptake and slowing implementation of public 
privQte partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector. 
1.6.3 Research aim 
The aim of the research is to identify factors within the institutional environment that 
constrain the uptake of Public private partnerships in the development of hydropower 
generation facilities in Uganda and propose strategies to mitigate these constraints. 
1.6.4 Objectives of the study 
1. Identify the drivers for public private partnerships including the process of 
implementation, characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the partnerships. 
2. To review literature on the Uganda electricity sector in order to identify the 
characteristics of demand, supply of power, understand the institutional framework, 
organisational setup and the experiences so far in the implementation of Public 
Private Partnerships. 
3. To identify institutional constraints to the implementation of public private 
partnerships especially with regard to the development of hydro-electricity 
generation capacity. 
4. Establish the relative importance of the identified constraints as perceived by the 
stakeholders involved in the development and implementation of public private 
partnership projects for hydropower generation facilities in the Uganda electricity 
sector 
5. Identify or propose measures and strategies through which the constraints could be 
addressed. 
1.7 Justification 
With Uganda currently unable to meet the electricity demand of the popUlation, the private 
sector through public private partnerships is being encouraged to invest in additional 
hydropower generation facilities (Electricity Act, 1999; MoEMD, 2002). Despite the 
structural retorms undertaken in the sector, private sector participation is still limited with 
many projects structured on the premise of public private partnerships not materialising. 
Therefore, given the importance of an adequate and reliable supply of electricity and 
continued government commitment to increase generation capacity through public private 
partnerships, it is necessary to identify from stakeholders involved in efforts geared at 
increasing hydropower generation as to what the constraints to implementation and deal 
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closure are. Once the constraints are identified, then strategies could be developed to 
facilitate speedy deal closure and successful implementation of projects thus enabling 
society to benefit from the spin off's of an increased supply of electricity. 
1.8 Methodology 
The research used a positivist approach and utilised quantitative research methods for data 
collection and analysis. A literature review was undertaken to identify constraints to the 
implementation of Public private partnerships in the development of hydroelectricity 
generation facilities. These constraints were incorporated into a Likert scale-style 
questionnaire that was administered to professionals involved in the development and 
implementation of public private partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector. The 
responses to the questionnaire were SUbjected to non-parametric statistical analysis using 
the computer package SPSS. This enabled the identification of the relative importance of 
each of the identified constraints as perceived by the stakeholders in the development of 
public private partnerships for hydropower generation in the Uganda electricity sector. 
1.9 Delimitations 
The investigation was limited to public private partnerships aimed at increasing the 
electricity generation capacity through the construction of hydropower facilities in Uganda. 
1.10 Outcomes 
From this research, the following outcomes are anticipated: 
• An understanding of the constraints to the implementation of Public private 
partnerships enabled the identification of strategies and measure to alleviate which 
could enable the realisation of the benefits of timely and efficient procurement 
through public private partnerships of additional generation capacity. 
• The study is valuable to developing countries that are or are considering the use of 
public private partnership procurement option for the development of 
infrastructure, especially for hydropower generation. 
1.11 Thesis structure 
This thesis consists of 5 chapters whose content is briefly described below. 
Chapter 1 -Introduction 
A brief background to the research topic is provided. In addition, the research problem, 
research questions, objectives and aims and scope of the study are highlighted. A brief 
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description of the research methodology to attain the objectives is discussed in this section 
of the thesis. 
Chllpter 2 - Literature review 
In chapter two, the thesis focuses on the form, characteristics, anticipated benefits and 
criticisms of public private partnerships. The ~hapter further provides an overview of the 
use of public private partnerships in the electricity sector and constraints experienced and 
how this ties in with the new institution economics. In addition, issues in the Uganda 
electricity sector related to the research questions are highlighted. 
Chllpter 3- Methodology 
In this section, a methodology is developed to achieve the aim of the research. A literature 
review is used to identify constraints to the development and implementation of public 
private partnerships in the electricity sector. A Likert questionnaire is used for data 
collection and quantitative methods applied to determine the importance of the identified 
constraints in the Uganda electricity sector 
Chapter 4 - DallllllJlIlysis 
This chapter will present the barriers to implementation of Public private partnerships in 
the Uganda electricity sector in a hierarchal order. Detailed discussions in relation to the 
literature or research objectives will not be entered in this chapter. 
Chllpter5 
This chapter presents the discussion of the results obtained in relation to the literature 
review and research questions. 
Chllpter 6 - Conclusions and recommendations 
Conclusions are drawn and recommendations made. This chapter will also provide a 






The provision of efficient, reliable and affordable physical infrastructure services such as 
water and sanitation, power, transport and telecommunications, is an essential requirement 
to the attainment of economic growth and sustainable development especially in 
developing countries (World Bank, 1994; Colin et al., 2004). Low (2004) posits that the 
construction of infrastructure provides the physical base upon which other development 
efforts are founded. 
In developing countries, the contribution of infrastructure to the attainment of millennium 
development goals (MDO's) cannot be underestimated. The MOO's are targets for 2015 
that were set and endorsed by 189 countries at the 2000 UN millennium general assembly 
(UN, 2000). The goals are aimed at reducing by half the proportion of people living in 
extreme poverty, provide education, improve health, promote gender equality and preserve 
the environment. Infrastructure also contributes to, or directly provides for, the betterment 
of human lives by enabling the provision of essential services e.g. access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation, or indirectly by providing the buildings in which health, 
education and medical services are offered and paved roads to access them (Cecilia et al., 
2004). 
It is however evident that the delivery of physical infrastructure facilities frequently lags 
behind a society's requirements, especially in developing countries (Colin et al., 2004). 
Moreover, efforts to expand service coverage around the world have been slow (Van, 
2005; World Bank., 2005) that: 
• An estimated 1.2 billion people living without access to electricity; 
• 1 billion without access to clean water; and 
• Nearly 1.2 billion without access to adequate sanitation. 
The delivery of services and infrastructure facilities has traditionally been undertaken by 
governments using finances sourced through various tax collection mechanisms and 
bilateral and multilateral development assistance from international organisations (Van, 
2005). Limitations on tax levels and a decline in bilateral and multilateral development 
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assistance have reduced the capacity of developing countries to provide infrastructure 
(UNIDO, 2001; DFID, 2004). As a result, economic growth and social development in 
many developing countries has stagnated (Colin et al., 2004) as these flows of investment 
have reduced. 
Besides the financial constraints limiting investment in new infrastructure and delivery of 
services, existing service delivery by state owned utilities departments is often poor 
(Benoit, 2005). Inefficiencies were estimated by the World Bank {(World Bank, 2005)to 
have cost public utilities departments $55 billion per annum in losses in the early 1990s, 
representing 1 % of GDP of developing countries and a quarter of their annual 
infrastructure investment within this period, a situation that is unlikely to have changed 
over the past decade. 
Benoit (2005) identifies the major challenges to delivery of infrastructure in developing 
countries as: 
• Poor performance by public utilities departments that constrains economic activity; 
• Fiscal drain created by deficits of these state owned companies, and; 
• The inability to finance needed capital improvement from increasingly constrained 
public sources (ibid.). 
In order to overcome a growing infrastructural backlog and infrastructure investment 
challenges as a result of constrained public utility departments' budgets, alternative means 
of raising both financial resources and ramping up of managerial capacity are being 
sought. 11lerefore many developing countries are encouraging private sector participation 
in the provision of finance and operational expertise in the delivery of public infrastructure 
services (Sader, 2000; Akintoye et al., 2003; Colin et al., 2004). These now widely used 
cooperative public and private responses are broadly referred to as Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). 
2.2 Public Private Partnerships 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an umbrella term used to define partnerships between 
the public and private sector for the purposes of designing, planning, fmancing, 
constructing projects and/or operating facilities which would be regarded traditionally 
falling within the ambit of the public sector. Infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, 
power plants, and telecommunication systems are prime examples (Richard et al., 2002). 
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Public private partnerships are long-term contractual arrangements intended to harness the 
skills and resources of both the private and public sector in the mutual delivery of public 
services or development of public infrastructure (SO, 2000). 
2.2.1 Forms of PPP 
The various PPP models are differentiated mainly by the degree of private sector 
involvement in terms of ownership, financing, duration, operation and maintenance. 
Models range from management contracts, service contracts, leases (typically where state 
assets are passed on to the private sector for mana~ement and maintenance for a period a 
time), through to Concessions, Build Operate Transfer (including the variants BOO, 
BOOT, DBFO). PPP arrangements in practice are often a mix of the different models 
highlighted (Department of Finance 2000; CFMEU,2006) 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Public Private Partnerships 
.. Traditional Procurement 
In the traditional procurement of built assets, the public sector firstly defines how a service 
should be provided and then engages different private companies to sequentially carry out 
the roles of design and construction of the infrastructure facility. The public sector retains 
ownership, management, operation and maintenance of the facility. Occasionally the 
public sector may award different contracts for operation and maintenance to different 
companies. 
Under traditional procurement it is rare for the designer and constructor to be involved in 
the operational phase of the facility and thus they do not benefit from any cost savings 
obtained during this stage. On the flipside, neither constructor nor designer is penalised 
should the facility not be able to meet the end user requirements or standards. The 
distinctive separation in functions and roles also hinders the use of whole-life cycle costing 
techniques (Rintala, 2005). 
In contrast, public private partnerships differ from this traditional procurement method by 
virtue ofa number of unique features: 
Roles 
A defining feature of public private partnership is the change in the traditional role of the 
public sector from specifying how services should be provided (relying on defining inputs) 
to one where services are specified in terms of outputs; emphasising 'what' rather than 
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'how' a service will be provided (Ahadzi, 200 I). Therefore under a PPP the public sector is 
a purchaser, and the private sector a provider of a stream of services arising from the 
existence of asset, Similarly under a PPP, the public sector enters into a long term 
performance based contract to purchase infrastructural services from the private sector 
vendor who undertakes to provide and manage them to a predetermined standard with 
ownership of the infrastructure often reverting to the public sector after an agreed period of 
time (Ahadzi etal., 2004). 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPVs) 
Public private partnership arrangements involve a number of parties and a multitude of 
contracts as shown in figure 1. During the development process for a PPP and prior to 
financial close (the point at which the final agreement between the public and private 
sector is reached), the project promoters from the private sector, through joint venture 
agreements form a legal entity referred to as a Special Pmpose Vehicle (SPY) for the 
purposes of entering into contract with the client (ClC, 1998 Leiringer, 2003) and 
arranging for financing for the project. It is this entity that the public sector enters into an 
agreement with, with ownership of the entity residing with the private sector stakeholders. 
Use of private capital 
At the core of a PPP arrangement is the use of private capital to deliver or improve public 
infrastructure services and facilities under a long term contract. The SPV structures 
financing from its private sector stakeholders through debt and equity contributions. The 
debt: equity ratio is usually in the range of 75:25 with the equity contribution being 
obtained from the SPV members. The debt financing is secured against the anticipated cash 
flows of the project with no avenue for the lenders to attach any other assets that belong to 
the project promoter's i.e. non recourse financing (Ahadzi, 2001; Akintoye et 01., 2003; 
Bing Li et 01., 2005). The ability to raise debt financing is greatly dependant on the 
limitation and distribution of risk amongst the project participants (Sader, 2000; Gerrard, 
2001). 
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Figure 1 PPP Arrangements and contracts 
Source PPP handbook, Ministry of Finance Singapore 
Risk Transfer 
Given the importance of risk to the financing of the project risk transfer between from the 
public to private sector and amongst the private sector stakeholders becomes critical. It is 
argued that the effective transfer of risk to the party that can best manage or mitigate it is 
important for the success of any public private partnerships (lIM Treasury, 1995; SO, 
2000; Akintoye et aI., 2003; Ahadzi et ai., 2004).Obtaining a favourable matrix for the risk 
allocation between the private and public sector partners has always proved to be a 
challenge. The risks involved can be broadly associated with the different stages involved 
in the process of delivering the service to the public i.e. obtaining financing, 
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implementation/construction ·phase risks, revenue risks, and operation and maintenance 
risks (Gallimore, 1997; Akintoye et al., 2003). 
Payments 
In PPP's, the private sector normally recoups its investment by levying end user charges 
for the period during which it is responsible for operating the fucility or managing the 
provision of the infrastructure services (Bennet et al., 1999). Alternatively the Spy may 
receive a unitary payment from the client during the period for which it is providing the 
service (Rintala, 2005). It is normally expected that there should be a relationship between 
the payments and quality of service provided (Ahadzi et al., 2004) to ensure that the 
private sector is appropriately incentivised. The terms of payment and quality of service 
delivery is specified in the contract between the public sector representative e.g. a utility 
body and the private sector operator represented by the SPY. In addition to this, to cater for 
the long term nature of PPP's, the contract usually has provisions on how and when the 
terms of payment can be changed (Sader, 2000; Ye et al., 2000; Ahadzi, 2001; Zhang, 
2005). 
Whole Life Cycle Costing 
The use of whole life cycle costing techniques is an important characteristic in the 
development of PPP'S projects. These techniques enable the determination of the cost of 
delivering the service or infrastructure facility over its life span. The performance of the 
responsibilities of design, construction on one hand and operation & maintenance on the 
other within one entity in a PPP'S arrangement provided the opportunity to align the 
incentives of both parties, justifying and enabling the use of the whole life cycle 
techniques (BC, 2003; Rintala, 2005). 
2.2.3 Benefits 0/ Public private partnerships 
The growing use of public private partnerships for the delivery of public infrastructure is 
motivated by a number of perceived benefits that include: 
Improved service delivery 
Under a public private partnership, the role of the state has shifted from defining how a 
service is delivered to merely defining that service. It is argued that public private 
partnerships are able to improve public sector service delivery by availing to the state 
private sector resources, such as management skills, innovation, experience, finances and 
marketing skills (Chege, 2001; Akintoye et al., 2003) that the state may not possess. Bing 
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(2003) also suggests that PPP's can provide infrastructural facilities at greater speed than 
the traditional methods of public sector procurement because the incentives and 
procurement priorities are different. For example, the importance of cash flow (loss of 
potential rents or charges) on completion of a facility is more critical to the private sector 
unlike the government which may be paying for a facility out of government revenues. 
Access to capital 
As previously mentioned, the increase in demand for public services as a result of 
population increase and economic growth has given impetus to the use of PPP'S. In 
situations where the municipal and national budgets are not sufficient to finance the 
required infrastructure, the private sector through public private partnerships has been 
incentivised to finance public infrastructure (Ahadzi, 2001; Akintoye et al., 2003). 
Off sheet balancing 
The PPP route also provides an additional advantage to the public sector of using private 
capital for infrastructural investment in that money borrowed by the private sector is not 
reflected on the public accounts even if the government is committing itself to pay in the 
future, the liability for the debt is not recognised as a government debt (Sader, 2000; 
Spoehr et al., 2002; Gerrard, 2001). It is worth noting that the cost of borrowing in private 
finance deals could be higher than what is experienced in public borrowing since 
governments can borrow at lower rates due to the fact that they can guarantee payments to 
an extent that the private sector can't. However the real benefit of PPP lies in the 
operational efficiencies gained (Department of Finance 2000). 
Value for money 
The potential to obtain 'value-for-money' defined as the achievement of the best from a 
project in terms of quality, quantity, cost and risk transfer within available resources has 
encouraged the use of public private partnerships. In a PPP, use is made of private sector 
fmances thus the private sector bears a higher financial risk in the contractual arrangement. 
This provides an incentive to utilise financial and other resources more efficiently. 
Moreover, PPP vendors, by providing excellent managerial expertise and innovation 
should be capable of achieving lower project costs, shorter construction times and better 
quality services (SO, 2000; Leiringer, 2001; Richard et al., 2002). The use of output based 
specifications and increased competition amongst the private firms further enables the 
attainment of value for money in PPP projects. 
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2.2.4 Criticisms 0/ Public private partnerships 
The use of public private partnerships as a vehicle for the delivery of public infrastructure 
. is without its critics. Some of the issues raised are: 
Lengthy negotiation period 
Whilst the private sector is recognised at being able to deliver infrastructure faster than the 
public sector, the development of a PPP is frequently subject to long pre-contract 
negotiations periods between the intended private and public sector partners. The 
negotiations involve amongst others the identification and allocation of risk between each 
party, somcing of and structuring of the debt and equity financing for the project The 
negotiation process is further made complex when it involves multiple parties as exhibited 
in fig 1 who may have different interests in the project (Ahadzi, 2001; Ahadzi et al., 2004; 
Kumar et al., 2005) 
High bidding costs 
High transaction costs have been a major complaint with the use of PPP'S. Both private 
companies and the public sector spend considerable amounts of money in tendering, and 
negotiating the PPP contract In addition the private company spends more on developing a 
competitive proposal (CFMEU, 2006). This in conjunction with the lengthy negotiation 
period invariably leads to higher bidding cost as both teams appoint top notch advisors and 
experts to guide them through the different requirements of design and bid documentation 
required for a PPP contract (Ahadzi, 2001). Reports indicate that on some projects, 
payments to advisors to the project participants have been 600010 over and above the initial 
budget (Ahadzi, 2001). This had the negative impact of leading to a reduction in 
competition as some firms withdraw at the bidding stage (Ahadzi, 2001; Ahadzi et al., 
2004; Bing Li et al., 2005). 
Project accountability 
Bing Li (2005) referring to Pollock and Vickers (2001) identifies the reduced 
accountability in PPP'S as a result of limited information disclosure. This is sanctioned by 
clauses in the contracts that classify some information as being commercially sensitive and 
thus out of the public domain. In contrast, the traditional procurement method allows for 
public audits of its processes as laid out by legislation of many countries. Additional 
concerns with the inability to structure contracts that are flexible and able to take care of 
unforeseen conditions in the future, Supernormal profits that are sometimes earned by the 
private companies and governments inability to transfer some kind of risk to the private 
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sector have also been raised as shortcomings of public private partnerships (CFMEU, 
2006). 
2.2.5 PPP procurement Process 
Many countries have produced guidelines to the use of PPP'S depending on their 
experiences, legislation and financial situation. The process described below serves to 
highlight the different roles played by the different actors in the development of a public 
private partnership. Guidelines as developed by the government of: UK (HM Treasury, 
1995); South Africa (Department of Finance 2000); by institutions including the European 
Commission (EC, 2003) and United Nations (UNIECE forum, 2000), that together inform 
this discussion, however, the similarity of experiences around the world means that many 
of these guidelines share the same basic principles differing in minor ways to suit the 
differing institutional environments with respect to legal, cultural ~d political contexts, 
for which they are formulated 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
A common starting point is the feasibility stage during which a Public Sector Comparator 
is developed. The PSC is an estimate of what it would cost the public department to 
perform the function or offer the service at the predetermined desirable level through 
traditional procurement methods. This cost is then compared with the private sector offer at 
the time of bid evaluation in order to determine whether the value for money would be 
obtained through the PPP approach. 
Advertising 
To the public, procurement process usually begins with the issuing of an advert in the 
international and national press requesting interested firms to express interest. The advert 
usually contains the scope of the project providing a brief background to the project, and 
nature of services required. The private sector participants interested then provide 
responses detailing their relevant company and personnel experience, financial and 
technical capabilities and legal instruments of the firm. 
PrequaJijication 
Based on the responses provided by the firms regarding their capabilities and an evaluation 
criteria developed by the team managing the procurement process, a short list of competent 
private partners is then complied that proceed to the next stage. All guidelines agree on the 
need to limit the participants in this next stage but without losing the element of 
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competition. This is because of the substantially high costs involved in developing a PPP 
tender submission. 
Request/or Proposal {RFOJ / Invitation To Tender (lIT) 
This is a detailed document issued to the short listed firms. The RFPIIIT contains a 
detailed description of the project goals clearly defining the output specification, criteria 
for evaluation, timeframe, minimum technical requirements. It is important that the 
RFPIITT is clearly and carefully developed because it forms part of the contract document 
The private sector then responds by providing a technical and financial proposal as per the 
requirements of the RFPIITT 
Selection 0/ pre/e"ed bidder 
The client then evaluates the proposals in comparison to each other and with the PSC. The 
firm whose proposal offers best value for money is then selected as preferred bidder with 
the second best firm being retained as a reserve bidder. The role of the reserve bidder is to 
exert competitive pressure on the preferred bidder during the negotiations phase that 
follows. 
Negotiation phase 
At this stage detailed negotiations are held and agreements arrived at as regards Payment 
terms, project implementation technicalities, dispute resolution methods, transfer of project 
assets licences, government subsides. This is usually the longest stage of the procurement 
process-giving rise to a number of costs incurred in terms of payments to the large number 
of experienced advisors on the teams (Ahadzi, 2004). 
Financial Close 
Successful negotiation leads to the tender being awarded to the bidder thus reaching 
fmancial close. Should negotiation fail with the preferred bidder then the reserve bidder is 
called upon for negotiations. A contract clearly defining the roles and responsibility of the 
public sector client and the private sector partner is then signed and is the main operational 
document of the partnership. 
Public private partnerships are finding increasing popularity in developing countries as an 
alternative to the traditional procurement method and have been used in a wide number of 
infrastructure development projects in a number of sector in various countries; e.g. power 
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sector (Wang et at., 1998; Blackman et at., 1999; ADB, 2000; Ahadzi et at., 2004; Kumar 
et at., 2005), housing sector (Rintala, 2005), education (Gunning et at., 2002), and water 
sectors (Abdul-Aziz, 2001). Private participation in the power sector has taken several 
basic forms, which include concessions, leases and management contracts, as well as 
Independent Power Producers (IPP's). 
2.3 PPPs in the power sector in developing countries 
The adequate supply of power has long been identified as being critical to the ability to 
enhance and sustain economic growth (World Bank, 1994) and necessary to meet the 
demands of industry, commerce, for domestic use and the movement of goods and people 
(PDD, 2005). The International Energy Agency, in the Energy Outlook Report (lEA, 2002) 
identifies the provision of an adequate and sustainable electricity supply in developing 
countries as fundamental to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
Access to an environmentally sustainable and modem energy supply directly reduces 
poverty by improving the financial wellbeing of the population through increased earnings 
from an imprOVed quality and range of products. 
Statistics from the international energy agency indicate that more than 1.6 billion people 
have no access to electricity and of these 99% live in developing countries. It is projected 
that in excess of 1.4 billion people that will still have no access to electricity in 2030 will 
be in developing countries. Of the 1.4 billion people 650 million and 680 million people in 
Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia respectively (lEA, 2002). 
In Africa, the major energy sources are biomass (48%), coal (17.2%), natural gas (11.3%) 
with renewable sources like Wind, Solar and geothermal combined contributing 0.1 % of 
the energy production. Despite many countries in Africa describing their hydropower 
potential as one of the most valuable resources with it's exploitation considered to be the 
backbone of future social and economic development (Alison, 2002; Head, 2003), only 
1.3% of 13% of the estimated world hydropower potential in Africa has been exploited 
(lEA, 2003). 
As a source of electricity, Alison (2002) enumerates a number of advantages of use of 
hydropower; such as cheaper operation and maintenance cost, multi purpose ability to be 
incorporated in schemes like irrigation, water supply, recreational activities, 
environmentally friendly and a sustainable option. Moreover there is wide ~eographical 
spread of hydropower potential around the world that can be developed in addition to the 
fact that advanced technology has been developed over the years. 
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The energy investment needed in developing countries (estimated at $5 trillion) for 
expanding the supply capacity and to replace existing and future supply facilities that will 
have been exhausted or become obsolete in the period of 2001-2030 are enormous and 
cannot be fully funded by governments who in their traditional role as owners of the 
energy companies have been the financers of investment in the electricity sector, the source 
of financing being the government budget and government sponsored borrowing (lEA, 
2003). This has necessitated the search for alternative delivery mechanisms. 
lzzaguire (2000) suggests that the need to expand capacity and increase reliability in an 
environment of tight budget constraints as being the driving force for the increased private 
sector participation in the energy sector. Increased power shortages aggravated by the 
increase in electricity demand as a result of rapid economic growth and social development 
and limited expansion of electricity supply facilities has prompted many countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia to seek new energy investment through private sector 
participation (Kumar et al., 2005; POD, 2005). 
2.3.1 Private sector participation 
Proj ect specific information gathered by the world bank (pPIAF, 2007) indicates that 
though the private sector is engaged under a number of different forms of contract 
including management contracts, leases, concessions and divesture the seemingly preferred 
mode of participation is that of Independent Power Producers (IPP's). Izzaguire (2000) 
further recognises the increasing role Independent power producers are playing in the 
power generation projects in developing countries. As a result, there is a desire by many 
governments to create an enabling government for IPP's rather than privati sing already 
existing generation plants. IPP's are the only form of private sector participation that 
involves actual private sector ownership of key power sector assets (Benoit, 2005). For this 
study, the following is adopted as a definition of independent power producers; 
"The classic IPP is a privately sponsored power plant that sells electricity under a 
long term contract. Typically, the off taker is a state-owned electric utility, although 
occasionally off takers have included private distributors or large private users. The 
plant is generally financed on a project basis, with a project-specific company 
established for the purpose. The company draws equity from a number of foreign 
and domestic investors and secures debt from a syndicate of banks on the basis of 
expected revenues" (Woodhouse, 2005 ,pg 8) 
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According to the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPJ) Projcct 
Jntabasc:, [00 developing countries awarded 1301 private sector moti vated infTllstructun: 
projtdS in the cn~rgy scctor (Sec Fig 2 for distribution arnongsl regions) worth $298,281 
million wOJth in ilwcslmcnt ~'een [990 and 2005. The major source ofinvtstment funds 
in these COtIIItries has been foreign capital. The investment has b«o unevenly distributed 
with Latin America gtning the largest share and Sub Saharan Africa tbe Icast (set Fig 3). 
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A surge in privale sedor investment in de,-eloping eountries was txp"rieru:cd through out 
the early 1990'5 peaking in 1997 at USS 46 billion (Fig 3) and thereafter decli ned pan ty as 
Ii resulL of the Asian Financial crisis with Latin America and East Asia experieocing the 
greatest decline. This finan cial crisis had the elTCCI of reducing tile grvwtb "f the energy 
demand as II result of slowed economic IIclivity and secondly, led 10 reduced j"tcTest in 
investing in deVeloping economies by international financial inSlilutiQns (Iz..uguire, 2000: 
Woodhouse. 2005). 
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With the (['o,\fIh in private OC<:I{)' p:>rlic iP'lLion &in~.., Lh" ! 980 '0, it W3~ hoped that by tiling 
advantage of the growing international financial ms..xclS and nC'" fmancing mechani~ms. 
tile increasing fiscal defieits and pt"l.'Ssure on constrained domestic budgets experienced by 
developing countriel; would reduc<: while the r~-,;uhing economic d l'cicncy ga ins would 
mitigate against the risks hrouglll about by deregulation (lEA, 2(03). 
As a prercquisit~, many developing countries have undenaken sector re fornls in order to 
provide the enabling "nv;ro",nNJI for private sector participation (ADB, 2000: Will iam <:1 
01.,2(06). These reforms were deemed necessary as the prior operational charocteristics of 
the electricity sector were considered nOI conducive for private sector panicipation. 
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2.3.2 Power sector reforms 
The management and provision of electricity has hitherto been the sole responsibility of 
the state, a role it carried out through vertically integrated state owned utilities such as the 
Uganda electricity board in Uganda (DEB) (Electricity Act, 1999; Engorait, 2004) and 
Water and Power Development Authority in Pakistan (Fraser, 2005). These utilities 
combined the functions of generation, transmission and distribution together with investing 
in the development of new facilities. 
State control of the electricity sector was motivated amongst others by the obligation to 
avail social services equally to all its citizens which made electricity a potentially 
massively consumed product thus a highly politicised and politically strategic 
infrastructural service (Henisz, 2002). Subsequently, operation of these state utility 
companies was often highly subsidised from the government budget and thus quite often 
the tariffs to the consumers were not reflective of the actual cost of delivery of the service 
(Blackman et al., 1999; ADB, 2000). However, budgetary constraints faced by 
governments in developing countries often meant inadequate financial support to the state 
owned utility companies; hampering their effective performance, with their operations 
characterised by poor service delivery (Benoit, 2005; William et al., 2006) manifested 
amongst others by frequent power outages, low area coverage, high transmission losses 
and inefficiencies in revenue collection (ADB, 2000; William et al., 2006). 
In summary, the lack of efficiency and poor financial performance of the state owned 
utilities largely attributed to the poor management practises, unrealistic regulation , 
unrealistic pricing decisions and government control of utility operations have been 
highlighted as some of the drivers for reform in the electricity sector especially in Sub 
Saharan Africa (Mugyenzi, 2001). 
Colin (2004) summarises the main characteristics of the reforms as being: 
i. Development of a regulatory framework to govern the activities in the sector. 
Usually an independent regulatory organisation is created and charged with the 
responsibility of overseeing private sector involvement in the energy sector. 
ii. Restructuring of the sector by unbundling the previously vertically integrated 
public utility companies into separate Generation Transmission and distribution 
entities. 
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iii. Introduction of competition (through the effect of ii above) to improve efficiency, 
customer responsiveness and innovation. 
The purpose of the reforms is to attract the private sector and introduce competition in the 
energy sector. The desire is that competition would be fostered by the private sector 
injection of both fmancial and managerial expertise. However, even after the reforms, the 
introduction of independent power producers' has been slow, fraught with controversies, 
delays, and debates (Gratwick et al.,2005) characteristics that are evident in similar efforts 
currently being undertaken by the Ugandan government. 
2.4 Uganda electricity sector 
Introduction 
Uganda is a country located in Sub Saharan Africa with a population of 24.4 million 
people of which an estimated 88% live in rural areas (Census, 2002). The country is 
currently experiencing a GDP growth rate of 6.5% projected. Multilateral and bilateral 
budgetary support in form of grants and loans will amount to 38% of the budget for the 
financial year 2007/2008 (Suruma, 2007). In order to sustain the economic growth and 
improve the general standard and quality of living of its people, the government of Uganda 
in its energy policy 2002 recognise the significant role played by an adequate and reliable 
supply of electricity (MoEMD, 2002). 
A consistent and reliable supply of electricity is important in sustaining economic growth 
because of the influence it has on amongst others; 
i. Cost of production 
ii. Competitiveness of the countries products on the international market 
iii. Creation of new industries that provide jobs and 
iv. Provision of other social services e.g. health, education and financial services 
2.4.1 Electricity sector profile 
The electricity sector consists of the areas of generation, transmission and distribution. 
Generation 
The Uganda electricity generation is predominantly hydro-based with the largest sources 
being the Nalubaale and Kiira hydro power stations on the river Nile with a combined 
installed capacity of 300MW. An estimated 17MW is generated at a number of small 
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hydropower stations around the country bringing the total installed hydropower capacity to 
3l7MW. However, this represents only 13% of the total hydropower potential estimated at 
2500MW available within the country (World Bank. 200Sb). In addition to an enormous 
potential of the undeveloped sites located along the River Nile there is abundant untapped 
potential to generate electric power from mini and micro hydro sites (0.1 -10 MW) located 
along numerous smaller rivers in the country (MoEMD, 2002). 
An additional and significant 1.5MW of electricity is being generated by the West Nile 
Rural Electrification company (WENRECo) using heavy fuel and supplied to the districts 
of Ama and Nebbi in northern Uganda. The amount generated is able to provide 18 hours 
of electricity to 1500 customers in the two districts (Mugyenzi, 2001; MoMED, 2002; 
Nyirinkindi,2003). 
Transmission 
Electric power is transmitted from the main generation point Nalubbale and Kiira power 
stations to the different areas in the country through a transmission infrastructure network 
consisting of l1l5Km of l32kv line and 54km of 66Kv.These lines terminate at power 
substations that step it down to 33Kv and llKv for distribution purposes. In addition 
during off-peak hours, power is exported to neighbouring countries of Kenya 30MW, 
Rwanda 5MW and Tanzania 9MW. The function of transmission is controlled by the 
Uganda electricity transmission company limited (UETCL) that is the single buyer for grid 
connected generation" (MugyeDZi, 200 I; MoMED, 2002; Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
Distribution of power within the districts in the country is done at and consists of 
3258Km of 33Kv lines and 6496Kv of llKv lines. The Voltage is stepped down to 4l5V 
and finally 220Vfor distribution to respective households (Mugyenzi, 2001; MoMED, 
2002; Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
Coverage 
Currently only 5% of the estimated population of 24 million is supplied with electricity i.e. 
connected to the national grid. The majority of grid connections are in the urban area with 
rural electrification standing at 4%. This low coverage and deficit in supply is further 
compounded by the growth in energy demand at 4 to 5MW per month partly as a result of 
a growing economy since 1986 averaging 6.3% in the last ten years without any 
corresponding increase in generation capacity (MoMED, 2002; Engorait, 2004). 
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Little or no investment, the civil wars experienced by Uganda prior to 1986, operational 
inefficiencies and a poor maintenance culture have allied to the deterioration of energy 
infrastructure. When combined with the growth in electricity demand projected to require 
an estimated 2000MW of new capacity by 2025 at a cost of US$ 3.5 billion and the 
competing demands for investment in the provision of other social services such as 
hea1thcare and education for the meagre financial resources available to the Ugandan 
government has motivated Uganda to find alternative ways of improving and increasing 
the generation capacity (MoEMD, 2002; Engorait, 2004). 
2.4.2 Power sector reforms and regulatory set lIP 
The government of Uganda has undertaken a series of reform steps in the electricity sector 
similar to those of other developing countries and in common with the international trend, 
these reforms are aimed at: 
i. Improving efficiency in the electricity sector by introducing competition; and, 
ii. Encouraging private sector investment and participation in the provision of electricity 
services. 
The power sector reforms in Uganda culminated in the enactment of the Electricity Act 
1999 that liberalised the sector and provided a legal framework for the operation of the 
electricity sector. The Act allowed for the formation of an independent regulatory authority 
for the sector referred to as the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA). This independent 
regulator which was established in 2000 has a statutory responsibility for overseeing the 
activities of the electricity sector under the policy guidance of the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral development (MoEMD, 2002). 
The ERA is mandated by the Electricity Act 1999 to 
i. Attract private capital into the electricity sector by creating an enabling environment 
for participation of the private sector. 
ii. Issue licences for generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity. 
iii. Set electricity tariffs. 
iv. Ensure that companies involved in the delivery of electricity service comply to set 
standards and conditions. 
To increase access to electricity in the rural areas, the government formulated the rural 
electrification strategy and plan. The overriding objective of the rural electrification drive 
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is to provide electricity to at least 1 ()O/O of the rural population by 2010. The 
implementation of the plan is being done by the Rural Electrification Agency (MoEMD, 
2001; MoEMD, 2002; Engorait, 2004). 
To enhance rural electrification, a 10 year multi sectoral programme Energy for Rural 
Transformation (ERn is being implemented with support from the World Bank. This 
programme has two major components. Under the first component, subsidies will be 
provided to the private sector for investment and expansion of the rural network including 
the expansion of the rural network and deVelopment of mini and micro hydropower 
stations (MoEMD, 2001; MoEMD, 2002). 
The second component of the programme is aimed at providing 2000 customers with off-
grid solar power. This aspect of the project is targeted at low consumption areas that are far 
from the national grid (MoEMD, 2001; MoEMD, 2002) and where it would be too costly 
to connect to the existing grid, or supply using traditional means. 
In the meantime, shortage in the electricity generation and supply has led to rationing of 
power supply, commonly referred to as "/oad shedding, " in which on a rotational basis 
some areas go without power for 24-hour periods. This has led to the slowing in economic 
growth due to reduction in productivity. To overcome this, the government has developed 
short and medium term measures to increase the supply of electricity. 
Consequently, in 2005, the government of Uganda as a short term measure to meet the 
electricity demand, entered a contract to procure 50MW of thermal generated power from 
Aggreko International Projects which had been granted a licence by ERA to generate and 
sell power to the national grid under the Build Own Operate contractual arrangement. 
Currently It was expected that by the end of 2006, a further 50MW would be 
commissioned by the same company. The procurement process for this tender is currently 
embroiled in controversy and as a result the additional 50MW had not been added to the 
grid at the time of writing (Migereko, 2006). The use of thermal generated electricity has 
lead to increases in the power tariffs because the plants that were c use diesel oil that is 
currently experiencing a rise in prices on the international market (ibid). 
Among the medium term strategies to increase electricity supply(MoEMD, 2002; 
Migereko, 2006), the Ugandan government is proposing to develop large hydropower 
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plants on the Nile at Bujagali (250MW) and Karuma (200MW) whilst also developing 
micro (:5 l00kW) , mini (:5 IMw) and small (:5 25MW) hydropower stations capable of 
generating an additional 50MW of electricity. 
Given the capital intensive nature of power investments particularly in the case of 
hydropower where, low operation costs are off set by high initial capital costs, and 
inadequacies of public financing to match growing demand, government is encouraging 
private sector investment in the form of IPP's to meet the energy demand (Migereko, 
2006). It is the intention of the government as captured in the sector policy report to 
finance, construct and operate the above mentioned hydropower stations through public 
private partnerships (MoEMD, 2002). 
2.4.3 Private sector involvement in the hydro power generation sector 
Existing Public private partnerships 
As a result of the electricity reforms of 1999, the initially vertically integrated utility body 
Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), which had hitherto been responsible for all regulatory, 
generation, transmission and distribution activities in the electricity sector was unbundled 
into the 
i. Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL) responsible for 
Generation, 
ii. Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL) responsible for 
transmission and 
iii. Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL) responsible for 
distribution entities respectively 
Government retained control, owns and operates the transmission infrastructure. UETCL is 
the sole buyer of grid connected electricity from UEGCL and in turns sells the electricity 
to UEDCL the sole distributor of electricity in the country (MoEMD, 2002). 
Through competitive tendering, concessions for the generation and distribution companies 
were awarded to the private sector. 
31 
Uganda Electricity Generation Compa11)' Limited (UEGCL) 
In the generation sector, a 20 year concession to operate and maintain the Nalubaale and 
Kiira hydropower stations located in Jinja was awarded to Eskom Uganda limited a 
subsidiary of Eskom Enterprises (Pty) Ltd of South Africa in 2002. UEGCL retains 
ownership and is responsible for the monitoring of the assets leased to ESKOM (MoEMD, 
2002; Engorait, 2004). 
Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL) 
UMEME Ltd a Joint venture between Eskom (SA) and Globeleq, a UK power firm, were 
awarded a 20 year concession in 2004 to manage the distribution system initially managed 
by the state owned utility Uganda Electricity Distribution Limited (Engorait, 2004). Under 
the concession agreement, UMEME was given a soft investment period of 18 months to 
improve collection rate, improve the distribution system and reduce the bad debt. After this 
period UMEME is to renew it commitment to the concession agreement. The concession 
terms also require UMEME to invest USD 65 million in the first five years and facilitate 
15000 new connections per year during the same period increasing this to 25000 new 
connections in the subsequent years (MoEMD, 2002) 
Proposed Public private partnerships 
In line with efforts to increase generation capacity by involving the private sector, 
government has packaged a number of hydropower projects as Public private partnerships. 
Of greater significance in the projects are the Bujagali and ~ hydropower stations. 
Bujaga/i Power project 
The proposed Bujagali hydropower project is to be built along the River Nile north of the 
Nalubaale and Kiira power stations. The dam with a generation capacity of 250MW is to 
be constructed under a Build Own Operate Transfer arrangement and when successfully 
implemented will be the first hydro Independent power project in Uganda. Construction of 
the dam is hoped to offer a long term solution to the current energy crisis and power 
generation deficit in the country (World Bank, 2007). 
The project, which is being developed by Bujagali Energy Limited (BEL) will encompass 
the construction and operation of a run of the river power scheme and 100km of 132Kv 
transmission lines to evacuate the generated power to the main grid (World Bank, 2007). It 
is estimated that the project will cost USD 750 million and financing is being provided , 
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partly by the Government of Uganda with the other equity and debt financers to the project 
developers being the World Bank, European Investment Bank (EiB), KFW Bankgrauupe 
amongst others (World Bank, 2007). 
BEL is an SPY formed by Industrial Promotion Services (Kenya) Limited and SG Bujagali 
Holdings Ltd; an affiliate of Sithe Global Power, LLC (USA). At the time of writing had 
finalised negotiations with the Government of Uganda and prospective financers. and 
construction works had been commissioned at the project site (Kauija et al., 2007). 
Karuma Power project 
This is a proposed run off the river hydropower scheme that will add 200MW to the 
national grid. It will consist of 4 units each capable of generating 50MW. The estimated 
costs for construction of both the hydropower dam and transmission lines are USD 450 
million. The lead project developer is NORP AK power AS a Norwegian Company. 
2.4.4 Private sector participation Challenges. 
Despite the Ugandan government's liberalisation efforts and attempts to implement 
conducive reforms, private sector participation and investment in new hydropower 
generation facilities is still limited, faced with many pitfalls and many proposed projects 
have not materialise. For instance, in the case of 250MW at BUjagali negotiations for the 
construction of the Bujagali dam commenced in 1994 with AES Nile Power as the private 
project sponsors proposing to construct the dam at a cost ofUS$582.0 Million. However as 
a result of protracted negotiations, allegations of corruption, resistance from environmental 
and civil society groups the project stalled in 2003 (Sasha, 2003) and the private project 
sponsor AES Nile Power pulled out of negotiations in 2004. The cancellation necessitated 
a costly re-bidding process that culminated in the appointment of Bujagali Energy Limited 
as the preferred bidder. Bujagali Energy Limited owned by SG Bujagali Holding Ltd (a 
subsidiary of Sithe Global power) and IPS (Kenya) Ltd. 
There have also been delays in project implementation despite expressions of interest by 
the private sector. A notable example is the prQposed construction ofa hydropower dam at 
Karuma Falls on the river Nile by the Norwegian company Norpak (Energy Information 
Administration, 2004). The dam which is intended to generate 200MW has also been on 
hold since 2003. Final approval for the project was only granted in early 2006 with 
construction expected to start in September 2007. 
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Under the Rural electrification program, which has attracted more private sector interest as 
a result of mainly government subsidises being offered, a number of firms have expressed 
intentions to develop mini and micro-hydropower generation facilities on the numerous 
rivers in the country. Unfortunately many of these projects have not been realised (GoU, 
2004). 
Furthermore, challenges in obtaining project financing by the private developers have been 
identified as a major cause for the delays in commissioning additional hydroelectric power 
through public private partnerships in Uganda (Bbumba, 2006). 
The above mentioned bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the implementation of private 
power projects increasingly make it more difficult to attract the private sector participation 
in the electricity sectors of many developing countries with the possible mismatch of 
investors expectations and investment conditions being a probable cause for the slow 
growth of private sector participation in the electricity sector (Izzaguire, 2000; Lamech et 
al.,2003). 
As contractual arrangements, PPP'Ss have been identified as having an immense potential 
in enabling a number of developing countries to meet their infrastructure needs, but the 
level of its success in different countries and different sectors within these countries varies. 
This variance suggests that the institutional environment within which a public private 
partnerships arrangement is implemented plays a significant role in its success or failure. 
Therefore, in order to understand the cause of this and develop measures to promote 
private participation in the provision of infrastructure, an examination of the institutional 
environment within which PPP arrangements are implemented together with the incentives 
and disincentives that lie therein is necessary. 
2.5 Theory oflnstitutions 
2.5.1 Importance of Institutions 
Institutions provide humanely imposed frameworks of informal (e.g. taboos, customs) and 
formal constraints (e.g. laws and rules) that together form. the "rules of the game" that 
shape social, political and economic aspects of human interaction (North, 1990; Ostrom et 
al., 1993; Furubotn et al., 1998). These institutional constraints provide a stable structure 
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for human interaction and incentives for individuals or organisations (groups of individuals 
bound by a common goal) to engage in economic activity; inevitably determining the 
performance of an economy (North, 1990). The institutional environment plays an 
important role in promoting economic development by providing varying structures of 
exchange depending on the complexity of the exchange or transaction (ibid). 
The institutional framework gives rise to entrepreneurs I organisations who, through 
different contractual arrangements, take advantage of the opportunities created by a given 
institutional environment. These entrepreneurs lorganisations can be defined as "players in 
the game" (North, 1990) and their choices of contractual arrangements are dependent on 
the risks and transaction costs involved in addition to anticipated benefits from carrying 
out the transaction (Furubotn et 01., 1998). 
In order to encourage these transactions to take place, it is important that the institutional 
environment meets the criteria of being stable and provide enforceable rules. An important 
function of the institutions is to reduce uncertainty; thus frequent and arbitrary changes to 
the rules would serve to increase uncertainty and the perception of risk involved with the 
transaction. This could invariable lead to an increase in the transaction costs involved 
(North, 1990; Furubotn et 01., 1998). A similar concern exists when it comes to 
enforceability of the rules, the cost involved in ensuring adherence to the contractual 
agreement should not be excessive as not to make the venture worthwhile to either 
contracting party (North, 1990). 
Therefore, the importance of institutions in determining the performance of an economy 
and of economic transactions or arrangements such as public private partnerships can be 
discussed on the basis of its impact on property rights and transaction cost involved in the 
successful implementation and completion of a transaction. 
2.5.2 Property rights 
The institutional environment defines and enforces the property rights upon which the 
transactions are based. Property rights are the benefits and restrictions to the use of an asset 
by a firm or an individual (North, 1990) and include the right to use the asset, earn income 
from it and lor transfer its ownership (Furubotn et 01., 1998). The importance of property 
rights is derived from the recognition of and willingness to enforce them by members of 
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society making them credible and thus able to offer a degree of certainty to transaction. 
Eggertsson (1995) categorises property rights as being: 
)0 Private property - Where an owner has exclusive rights and can transfer these 
rights to others. 
)0 State property -. Control over the resource is retained by the state and the user has 
no rights to transfer 
)0 Community property - Control over the resources lies with a community of users 
)0 Open access - open to all with no limitations 
By means of contractual agreements, bundles of property rights over an asset can be 
exchanged between parties bearing in mind that one cannot transfer more rights than he 
possesses (Furubotn et al., 1998). Eggertsson (1995) further shows that the degree of 
control over assets affects the decisions taken by the owners or users of these assets. 
As a result of the heavy initial investment required in developing electricity infrastructure, 
with project revenues and profits projected over a long period of time, a stable, consistent 
and clearly defined regime of private property rights is obviously important to encourage 
private sector participation. Credibility of the property rights regime provides a higher 
degree of certainty in transaction which acts as an incentive because the perception of risk 
e.g. the risk of government expropriation or failure to owner contract obligations is 
reduced (North, 1990; Ostrom et aI., 1993; Henisz, 2002). Key to the success of 
contractual agreement is the ability to have mechanisms to be able to enforce and resolve 
conflicts concerned with property rights (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
2.5.3 Transaction costs 
North (1990) defines transaction costs as the costs involved in establishing (measurement 
costs) and enforcing (enforcement costs) the transaction. The measurement costs are those 
that are concerned with the process of measuring the attributes of the good being 
exchanged together with costs of measuring and defining the rights being exchanged 
(North, 1990). Ostrom, 1993 ideD.tifies these costs as ex- ante and include costs that arise 
from activities like conducting of feasibility studies, correspondence with different parties 
and negotiating contract tenns. 
On the other hand, the enforcement costs are ex-post and include cost involved in 
monitoring contractual performance, litigation, contract amendment, maintaining 
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harmonious relationships amongst the different parties to a contract (Ostrom et al., 
1993).Consequently, the magnitude of transaction costs is determined by the frequency of 
interaction between the parties, uncertainty of transaction and nature of asset involved in 
the interaction. 
The success of an institutional arrangement is influenced by the perception of the players 
as to what the risks of transaction failure are and the associated transaction costs. That is an 
individual or organisation is motivated by the anticipated benefits that will accrue from the 
successful completion of a transaction. Therefore should the transaction costs or risks be 
greater than the anticipated benefits, the transaction is likely to fail. Failed transactions are 
a loss to society through the denial of the wider benefits that would have otherwise accrued 
to them. 
Ostrom (1993) associates the institutional environment with incentives and disincentive to 
sustainable development of infrastructure. For instance the lack of adequate incentives 
within the institutional environment has been identified as a cause for the failure to 
improve infrastructure provision in developing countries (World Bank, 1994). 
In conclusion it is recognised that the institutional environment has a significant role to 
play in enabling infrastructure investment thereby increasing the infrastructure stock. A 
stable private property regime acts as an incentive to private sector participation in the 
provision of public infrastructure for it allows for certainty to transactions. An unstable 
property regime only serves to increase the transaction costs resulting in less motivation 
for the individual to take advantage of an opportunity through a given contractual 
arrangement It is therefore important that the framers of the "rules of the game" are aware 
of the expectations of the participants in order to establish an appropriate institutional 
environment or improve upon an existing one. 
PPP's as vehicles for delivering this investment and increasing infrastructure stock are 
invariable affected by the existing investment environment in a country and variance in the 
institutional environments could offer explanation to the success or failures of many PPP 
initiatives more importantly for sectors like the electricity sector that need large amounts 
of capital and are long-term investments. 
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2.6 Constraints to Private participation in the energy sedor in developing 
Countries 
The inadequacies institutional environment to effectively deliver infrastructure framework 
has been identified as one of the hindrances to private sector participation in efforts geared 
at increasing the power supply in developing countries (Jyoti et al., 1998; UNECA, 2006; 
William et al., 2006). The source of constraints to the development of private sector 
participation in the energy sector of developing countries can broadly be categorised under 
Legislative and regulatory inefficiencies and restrictions, difficulty in obtaining finances 
and institutional challenges. 
The formation of effective regulatory and legal environment is widely regarded as 
important to enable private sector participation in infrastructure development. Effective 
regulatory processes should provide guidelines to private sector participation thus offering 
an element of predictability to the investor (ADB, 2000; Sader, 2000). In addition, it is 
important that a regulatory regime balances the need to provide incentives to attract 
investment with that of protecting the interests of the consumers thus maintaining public 
confidence in the regulatory regime. 
The appropriate legislation in terms of Commercial law, property law and contract law 
should be in place for it provides avenues of redress in situations of dispute and it is 
imperative that governments show the willingness to abide by these when the need does 
arise (ADB, 2000; Sader, 2000; William et al., 2006). 
However presence of regulatory framework doesn't necessary guarantee success of private 
sector participation but an effective legal and regulatory environment provides for a degree 
of predictability helping instil investor confidence and reducing the investor's perception 
of both political and regulatory risk (ADB, 2000; Sader, 2000). This withstanding, in 
adequate regulatory and legal frameworks have has been a major factor for the failure to 
realise private sector participation in the energy sector of many countries (Sader, 2000; 
Fraser, 2005; Woodhouse, 2005; Gervog, 2006 UNECA, 2006). 
When formulated, the regulatory and legal frameworks should be clear and unambiguous. 
Ambiguity or lack of clarity of relevant laws and regulations only serves to increase the 
level of perception of risk to the investors leading them to rely on special situations or 
political patronage as a means of securing contracts and this is detrimental in that contracts 
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are then not awarded on merit (ADB, 2000). In a World Bank survey (Lamech, 2003), 
clarity of regulations and the strength of legal frameworks were considered as the lead 
concern of investors when deciding where to invest (Lamech, 2003). A case in point was in 
China where the ambiguous nature of Chinese law as regards BOT investments has been 
ranked as the lead cause of foreign investor apathy to investing in the energy sector 
(Blackman et ai, 1999). 
Restrictive conditions imposed by regulations also deter private sector participation. The 
restrictions on the rate of return on investment in Pakistan to 15% (Sader, 2000) and China 
12%, latterly revised to 15% (Blackman et ai, 1999) are examples of cases where private 
sector participation has been impinged. On the other hand, concerns were raised of the high 
rate of return at 20 % being achieved by the investors on the Shajiao B Power Plant project 
(Wang & Tiong, 2000). Therefore it is important that when formulating regulations, 
governments strike a favourable balance as far as a cap on the rate of return is concerned. 
A 2002 World Bank survey indicated that the majority of investor favoured a rate of return 
of above 16% (Lamech, 2003). Note should also be made that investors will desire a higher 
rate of return in an environment where the perception of risk is high a case in point is the 
Shajiao B power project where it is argued that an increased perceived country risk was the 
justification used for the high rate of return (Ye & Tiong ,2000). 
Furthermore, regulation imposing restriction on foreign ownership of power sector assets 
e.g. Malaysia 25%, China 30% and Philippine 40% (Jyoti et aI., 1998; Blackman et ai., 
1999; Fraser, 2005; Woodhouse, 2005) inhibits the full realisation of the potential of 
private sector participation in a number of countries. Restriction on ownership is usually 
deemed necessary to prevent undue influence arising from the foreign control of key power 
sector assets but as an alternative, it has been argued that by strengthening the regulatory 
environment abuses by these companies can be controlled (Blackman et ai, 1999; Colin, 
2004). Secondly, giving priority during the selection process to foreign companies 
partnering with local companies would still be able to achieve the desired goal of 
controlling foreign ownership of key assets while providing the added advantage of 
developing the local skills capacity (ADB, 2000). 
Reforms that usually preceded private sector participation in the electricity sector 
characteristically led to the creation of a regulatory body to oversee the sector. 
Independence while carrying out its duties is important in order for the regulatory body to 
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perform its dual role of encouraging private sector investment and protecting the 
consumer's interest. The regulatory body should be independent from government 
interference and have the ability to with stand pressure from public opinion and industry 
players more so when setting tariffs and enforcing contracts. This should be facilitated by 
providing sufficient financing and qualified staff to the regulatory body. Regulatory 
independence is an incentive and influences the decisions to invest in a given country 
(Lamech, 2003; Colin, 2004). 
In relation to this, political interference has also been cited as a cause for failure of private 
sector investment in the power sector a case in example is in Zimbabwe where a contract 
was arbitrarily awarded to the Malaysian firm YTL as the preferred bidder for the Hwange 
project after a state visit by the Malaysian prime minister short-circuiting an ongoing 
tender process (Sader, 2000), Similar occurrences have .been reported in the Indonesian 
energy sector with regards to award ofPaiton and Tanjung Jati IPP's tenders to enterprises 
suspected of having close links to the politically powerful Suharto family (Williams, 2006) 
raising concerns about corruption and cronyism. 
Failure to honour their contract obligation by some governments in the developing 
countries causes a lack of interest from the private sector. An example is Pakistan where a 
change in government led to the cancellation or renegotiation of contract terms for a 
number ofIPPprojects (Sader, 2000; Fraser, 2005), others being in India (Jyoti et ai, 1998) 
and China (Blackman et al, 1999). This is especially significant for given that independent 
power producer (IPP) contracts range from 10-30 years and are thus likely to span over a 
number of political government changes. Other forms of renegade on contracts by 
governments e.g. failure to implement power increases or purchase power at the agreed 
cost have also been identified as a reason for limited private sector participation in the 
power sector (Woodhouse, 2005). 
The role political will and support plays in the development of privately sponsored 
infrastructure projects and cannot be underestimated. This was evident in the reform of the 
Armenian power sector where the commitment of the Annenian government saw the 
country through a turbulent process of increasing and improving the electricity sector 
through private sector participation (Gevorg, 2006). The influence of politics on regulatory 
framework is immense (Chege, 2004) and should be positively harnessed to encourage 
private sector participation in developing countries. Farlem (2005) goes on to mention 
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public private partnerships including the N4 toll road project in South Africa, water and 
electricity provision in Gabon amongst others that have succeeded as a result of political 
support. 
The slow implementation of sector reform programs has variously been identified as a 
cause for the slow or non realisation of private sector developed projects in the electricity 
sector. Slow implementation of reforms in the energy sector in China (Blackman et ai, 
1999) and Pakistan (Fraser, 2005) are credited as having had a contribution to the slow 
realisation of IPP projects. William (2006) identifies the implementation of a "standard 
menu of reforms" as a possible cause for the difficulty experienced in undertaking reforms 
in the electricity sector of many developing countries. To overcome this, it is suggested 
that countries should implement reforms that are in response to the country's sector 
problems and in tandem with their institutional capabilities, political and social 
characteristics. 
Lack of established project approval processes (Blackman et aI, 1999) or other areas where 
there is a lack of transparency (Sader, 2000) have caused delays increasing transaction 
costs in the development of independent power project and served to discourage private 
sector investment especially considering that there is a long payback period associated with 
power projects (Antonette, 1999) which conflicts with the majority short term gains 
desired by private investors. 
Delays in obtaining government approvals and licences as a result of lengthy bureaucratic 
processes and many project approval requirements have also been identified as a cause for 
failure of private sector investments in developing countries (Lamech, 2003). India is a 
classic example where shared authority and responsibility between the central government 
and the state government leads to the need to obtain more than 100 clearances before 
promoters can approach lenders (Jyoti 1999; Sader, 2000). Besides being time consuming, 
this level of bureaucratic complexity unnecessarily increases the lag time between project 
conception and final implementation stifling private sector initiatives and increasing the 
associated overhead costs. 
Project financing of IPP schemes is normally of limited or non-recourse financing, 
therefore the project depends on streams of revenue to be generated on completion. In a 
system where there is a single buyer, the promoters of IPP projects have to rely on the 
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creditworthiness or guarantees offered by the power purchaser. In India, the perceived lack 
of creditworthy of the State Electricity boards and reluctance of the government to provide 
guarantees to promoters ofIPP projects has caused the failure to reach financial closure on 
a number of IPP projects (Jyoti, 1999; ADB, 2000). This is exacerbated in many other 
developing countries by the lack of information to rate the creditworthy of government 
utilities involved in private infrastructure projects (Devapriya, 2003) 
Project financing for IPP schemes relies to a great extent on foreign capital both for debit 
and equity financing particularly in developing countries where capital markets are usually 
underdeveloped, therefore foreign exchange risks i.e. availability, transferability and 
convertibility are important consideration for investor interest. Possibly more important to 
promoters of IPP's are the conversion losses in a volatile foreign currency environment 
especially since the projects are long term and rely on cash flows that are predominantly in 
domestic currency (Sader, 2000; ADB 2000) 
The constraint of foreign exchange risk identified above could be minimised by utilising 
credit facilities in local currency from domestic financial institutions but the weak and 
immature nature of the financial markets in many developing countries has made the 
raising of long term debt from local companies difficult (Jyoti et al., 1998; ADB, 2000) 
with the isolated exceptions of countries such as South Africa. 
The onset of private sector participation in the energy sector as often experienced public 
resentment as a result of prices increases and assertive payment collection mechanisms 
through prepaid meters and disconnection without a commensurate improvement in service 
delivery. These price increases are as usually a result of governments holding the cost price 
below market rates by a complex system of subsidies (ADB, 2000). Furthermore, the 
setting of electricity prices is also problematic to the private entity because of the lag in 
time between cost increases and price adjustments by the regulatory authorities to reflect 
these increased costs (Blackman et al., 1999). 
Additional resistance from different interest group's represented by NGO's, civic societies 
and community organisations has also led to the reduction of foreign private sector 
investment in a number of developing countries. In the energy sector, different groups e.g. 
public interest groups, as a result of the potential price increase, usually manifest this 
resistance (Hall et al., 2005). Increasing concern for environmental issues, opposition from 
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environmental groups and the accompanying bad press have been identified as important 
factors in the reluctance of financial institutions to get involved in the development of 
hydropower projects (WeD, 2000). As identified previously, pressures from environmental 
groups have slowed the implementation ofPPP's for hydropower generation in Uganda. 
Another cause of delays has been attributed to the low level of skills both in the public and 
private sector with regard to the implementation and development of public private 
partnerships(Moreldge et al., 1998; Bing Li et al., 2005).This is attributed to the fact that 
PPP's are a new concept in many countries and the frequency of their implementation still 
low (Bing Li et al., 2005). 
It is also recognised that though more familiar with the traditional procurement and 
engineering aspects of infrastructure projects, lack of in-depth knowledge and experience 
by public sector representatives on the various financial and legal aspects of IPP's has 
always handicapped them during negotiations with their more skilled private sector 
counterpart (ADB, 2000; Sader, 2000). This has lead to the implementation of contracts 
that are unfavourable often requiring renegotiation or at times complete abandonment 
(Ahadzi et al., 2004) 
In a review of PPPs in the ~ Bates suggests the need to increase the interaction between 
the public and private sector in addition to training the practitioners involved in PFI to 
increase there knowledge. (Bates 1992) 
2.7 Outline of constraints 
From the above discussion below is a summary of the identified constraints to private 
sector investment and participation in the provision of public infrastructure through public 
private partnerships. These can be categorised as Regulatory, legal, Financial, Institution 
and political: 
A. Regulatory 
1. Lack of an enabling regulatory framework to support the participation of the 
private sector. 
ii. Weak regulatory framework: lacking in clarity and ambiguous. 
iii. Slow implementation of power sector reforms. 
iv. Lack of independence of the regulatory body. 
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v. Many requirements to obtain project approval. 
vi. Lengthy project approval process. 
vii. Restrictions on rate of return on investment 
viii. Restrictions on the level of foreign ownership of companies. 
B Institutional 
ix. Poor coordination between government departments. 
x. Delays as a result oflengthy bureaucratic procedures. 
Xl. Low level of skills of personnel involved with PPP. 
xii. Accusations of corruption and corrupt tendencies. 
xiii. Resistance from environmental groups. 
xiv. Resistance from civil society organisations. 
xv. Public resentment as a result of tariff increases. 
xvi. Investors concerns for need for intensive managerial resources. 
C Political 
xvii. Political Interference in procurement process 
xviii. Lack of political will and support. 
D Legal and Financial 
xix. Lack of enabling legal framework. 
xx. Failure of government to honour its contract obligations. 
xxi. Investors concerns of foreign exchange risk. 
xxii. Inability of local Institutions to provide equity financing. 
xxiii. Poor creditworthiness of power off-taker. 
2.7.1 Outline 0/ effects on deal closure 
Furthermore from the discussion, the following effects of the above mentioned constraints 
on the uptake.and implementation of public private partnerships were identified 
i. Increased perception of country risk by the private sector. 
ii. Increased exposure to foreign exchange risks as a result of the lack of readily 
available local financing. 
iii. Lengthy contract negotiations. 
iv. Increased transaction costs. 
v. Poorly formulated contracts and projects. 
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vi. Contract cancellation or renegotiation. 
vii. Public resistance to the implementation of projects. 
viii. Failure to reach financial close of initiated projects. 
ix. Limited or no private sector participation. 
x. Slow implementation of Independent power projects. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature identifying the importance of infrastructure in 
enabling and sustaining economic and social growth. The chapter goes on to identify 
constrained public budgets and poor service delivery as the major motivations for the use 
of PPP as a public infrastructure delivery vehicle. Subsequently the chapter presents the 
anticipated benefits and criticisms for the use of PPP. The role of PPP in the electricity 
sector is discussed. Attention is drawn to the significant impact the institutional 
environment and the incentives therein have on the development and implementation of 
public private partnership as an institutional arrangement. The chapter concludes by 
presenting a classification of the constraints encountered in the implementation and 





This chapter expounds on the methodology used to detennine the relative importance of 
the factors that constrain the uptake and implementation of public private partnerships in 
the Ugandan electricity sector. Discussed in this chapter are the research, data collection 
and data analysis methods together with the reasons for their choice. 
The methodology consisted of three phases: 
Phase 1 Preliminary study 
This involved a detailed literature review aimed at obtaining an understanding of Public 
private partnerships, the Ugandan electricity sector and constraints that affect the 
implementation of Public private partnerships in the electricity sectors of developing 
countries. Information was obtained from journal articles, conference pUblications, 
-newspaper articles, organisational data bases, reference books and internet searches. 
Phase 2 Data collection 
The identified constraints from the literature, supplemented by interviews with 
professionals in the sector were used to develop a five point scale Likert questionnaire that 
was administered to a wider range of professionals involved in the development of public 
private partnerships in the electricity sector in Uganda. Purposive and "snow balls" 
sampling techniques were used to identify respondents. The sample consisted of 
managerial level professionals who have had work experience on the development of 
public private partnership projects in the Uganda electricity sector. 
Phase 3 Data analysis, discussions and conclusions 
The data collected was coded, entered and analysed using SPSS. Respondent 
characteristics where determined using frequency tables generated from the data, the mean 
score method was used to rank the constraints and nonparametric tests were done to 
determine correlations and relationships between the different categories of respondents. 
The results were then discussed in relation to literature review findings and research 
objectives. 
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3.1 Research method 
There are two main approaches to conducting research. These are the quantitative and 
qualitative methods linked to the positivism and interpretive paradigms respectively 
(Fellows et af., 2003). 
Easterby -Smith et af. (2002) observes that a key aspect of positivism is that the social 
world exists externally and that its properties should be measured through objective 
methods rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection and intuition. 
He further identifies that the positivist paradigm is underpinned by a number of 
assumptions at the ontological and epistemology levels. At the ontological level, the 
assumption is that reality is external and objective, while at the epistemological level, the 
assumption is that knowledge is significant only if it is based on observations of this 
external reality. 
Associated with positivism are the ideas of rationalism, objectivity and empiricisms 
(Fellows et af., 2003) which are manifested in the characteristics enumerated by and 
adapted here from Easterby -Smith et af 2002. 
Table 3. 1 Characteristics of the positivist paradigm 
Characteristic 
The observer Must be independent 
Human Interest Should be irrelevant 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality 
Research progress through Hypotheses and deduction 
Concepts Need to be operationalised so that they 
can be measured 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to simplest terms 
Generalisation through Statistical probability 
Sampling requires Large numbers selected randomly 
This research was undertaken based on the positivist paradigm and encapsulated the 
aforementioned characteristics. A hypothesis was developed section 1.6.2 and utilising 
quantitative methods, elucidated below, sought to objectively determine the relative 
importance of identified factors as constraints to the development of public private 
partnerships as perceived by stakeholders in the electricity sector in Uganda. 
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3.1.1 Qualitative and Quantitative research methods 
Qualitative research methods seek to understand people and their pen::eptions. The 
qualitative approach allows for the collection of detailed data over a relatively long period. 
It is inductive and explanatory in nature. Qualitative approaches are suitable for use in 
investigating processes, new subject areas or areas where little information exists and are 
acknowledged as a suitable strategy for developing hypothesis. Qualitative methods further 
render themselves useful when it comes to validating findings obtained through 
quantitative methods. The shortcomings of this approaches is the , large volume of data 
collected that needs to be subjected to complex and labour intensive analysis techniques. 
Quite often the objectivity of qualitative data analysis is questioned (Amaratunga et al., 
2001; Fellows et al., 2003). 
Quantitative resean::h methods on the other hand are deductive in nature seeking to test 
hypothesis generated from theory and a literature review. Data collected is subjected to 
statistical analysis and conclusions drawn in relation to the theory and literature. 
Quantitative approaches are usually criticised for their inability to offer deeper underlying 
meanings or explanations to phenomenon but the capacity to be replicated, tested for 
reliability, Validity and enabling objective analysis are identified as the advantages 
(Neuman, 1994; Amaratunga et al., 2001; Fellows et al., 2003). 
In addition to the above considerations,. the choice of a research method is influenced by 
accessibility to information required to solve the resean::h problem. Easterby et al., (2002) 
recognises the influence access to information has on the nature of research problems 
investigated and methods adopted in the management research domain 
A quantitative approach was used in this study to identify the importance of the identified 
constraints to the development of PPPs in the Uganda electricity sector. Considerations 
that further motivated the use of quantitative approach were; the anticipated difficulty in 
accessing project specific documents and the possibility of present or past employees of 
organisations involved in the development of PPP being unwilling to discuss project 
related activities in detail. This is founded on the premise of the need to protect their 
current positions or not jeopardise company activities. 
Similarly, a number of studies on pen::eptions of stakeholders as to the constraints to the 
implementation of PPP/PFI have used quantitative methods e.g. (Akerele et al., 2003; 
Bing Li et al., 2005). 
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3.2 nata collection instrument 
A Likert scale style questionnaire was used for data collection. Arguments abound on 
whether a Likert scale is an ordinal or interval scale. Considered as an ordinal scale, there 
is no meaning attached to the difference or distances between two numbers on the scale 
unlike if considered as an interval scale (Siegel et al., 1988; Jamieson, 2004). Jamieson 
(2004) further points out that though the categories with ordinal scales have a rank order to 
them, it cannot be assumed that the intervals between the values are the same. The nature 
of scale used is important as it determines what statistical processes can be used for 
analysis in order to get meaningful conclusions (Siegel et al., 1988; Neuman, 1994; 
Jamieson, 2004). The Likert scale used for this research was ordinal. 
Used as an ordinal scale, Fellows and Liu (1997) identify the advantages of the Likert scale 
as: 
i. Allowing the researcher elicit peoples opinions i.e. extent of agreement or 
disagreement with a statement; 
ii. Enabling the production of hierarchies of preferences of the respondents; and, 
iii. Generating a hierarchy of preferences for different categories of respondents in the 
sampling space that can be compared. 
Some disadvantages have been identified with the use of questionnaires and these include 
limitation to use with only literate respondents, low response rates in some instances and 
challenges in their effective design. The advantages of questionnaire method for data 
collection and still underpinning its popularity are; it is cost effective, relatively easy to 
implement and ensures anonymity of the respondent (Neuman, 1994; Easterby et al., 
2002). 
3.3 Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first section consisted ofa combination of 
open and closed ended questions aimed at collecting information regarding the 
characteristics of the respondents. Open ended questions allow the respondent to provide 
there own answers where the researcher cannot with confidence anticipate all the probable 
responses to a question (Eckhardt et al., 1977; Easterby et al., 2002; Fellows et al., 2003). 
Included in this section were questions regarding the kind and duration for which they have 
worked for the organisation, years of work experience in the electricity sector both in 
Uganda and elsewhere, experience with PPP projects? 
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The second section solicited their perception regarding the importance of twenty three 
constraints to the development and uptake of public private partnerships for hydropower 
generation as identified through the literature review. The second section was designed in a 
five point Likert scale with the respondents being asked to indicate their level of agreement 
or disagreement to the statements according to the following scale strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
Neuman (1994) states the need for the questions in a questionnaire to be tested for clarity 
and ability to deliver the intended meaning to· the respondent. This is done on a small 
sample of respondents with similar characteristics as to those for whom the survey is 
intended. To check the suitability, clarity and appropriateness of the questions, drafts of the 
questionnaires were discussed with three government officials, two private sector company 
representatives and one energy professional/consultant all having experience with the 
development of hydropower projects through public private partnerships in Uganda. The 
questionnaire was subsequently refined before distributing to a wider group of respondents. 
A copy of the questionnaire is in appendix A 
3.4 Sampling 
The target population of the survey consisted of managerial level staff representing 
government ministries and departments, electricity regulatory body, private companies 
both those that have expressed interest or are involved in the PPP projects in the electricity 
sector, representative of civil society organisations and energy professionals e.g. energy 
consultants, researchers and specialist advisors e.g. lawyers working in organisations that 
are involved in the development ofPPPs. 
The Lack of a comprehensive reliable list of all participants in the development of 
hydropower projects through PPP necessitated the use of non random sampling techniques. 
The respondents were identified through purposive and "snowballing" sampling 
techniques. To use the purposive sampling technique, the researcher should use 
professional judgement to identify respondents who are knowledgeable in the subject area 
(Rea et al., 2005). For this research, the respondents were selected on the basis that their 
wolk experience with PPP projects provides them with sufficient knowledge to respond to 
. the issues that will be raised in the questionnaire. With "Snowballing", a person contacted 
in an organisation recommends another either in the same or another organisation to whom 
the questionnaire can be administered (Rea et al., 2005). 
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3.5 Questionnaire administration 
A total of Seventy one (71) self administered. questionnaires where delivered. by hand to 
the identified possible respondents. Prior to delivering the questionnaire, the respondents 
were contacted by telephone to ensure their willingness to participate in the survey. The 
questionnaire had a cover letter indicating the objectives of the research and guaranteeing 
confidentiality to the respondent. Sixteen (16) questionnaires where administered to 
respondents from the private companies involved in the development of PPP for 
hydropower generation, eight (8) questionnaires to all possible respondents from top level 
management of the electricity regulatory body, thirty five (35) questionnaires to various 
respondents from different government bodies I ministries. Seven (7) questionnaires to 
professionals! consultants involved with PPP projects, five (5) questionnaires to 
respondents from civil society organisations. 
Follow up visits to pick up or remind the respondents about the questionnaires were 
repeatedly done. To further encourage respondents and increase the response rate, it was 
made known to the respondents that the finding of the study could be availed to them on 
request. The process of data collection was done from January to February 2007. 
It was particularly a challenge to administer the questionnaire to the latter categories of 
energy professionals and civil society organisations because lack of coordination and 
knowledge about each others activities, secondly there was repeated failure to honour I 
agree to appointments previously set. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The data collected was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The 
questionnaire was coded to enable entry into SPSS. The respondents where categorised 
into 5 groups depending on the organisation they work for. Response options C and F to 
Question l' "what kind of organisation worked do you work for?" were collapsed to fonn 
the category private sector and data obtained from respondents entered accordingly. 
Similarly the responses to number of years as requested in questions 2 and 4 were 
collapsed into 5 groups consisting of a range of four years each i.e. 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, 
17-20, 
Non parametric tests were chosen for the analysis of the data collected. Nonparametric 
tests are used when the data violates parametric assumptions of nonnaIity and interval 
measured data (Siegel et a1., 1988; Field, 2005). Non random sampling methods were used 
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for data collection, hence non- normally distributed and the data collected was ordinal in 
nature. 
3.6.1 Reliability test 
Reliability of a scale can be viewed in terms of stability i.e. the scales ability to elicit same 
responses when administered to the same respondent under similar circumstances and 
internal consistency which is concerned with the scales ability to measure the construct 
under investigation (Eckhardt et a/., 1977; Neuman, 1994). Cronbach's coefficient Alpha 
was determined and used as an indicator of the reliability of the five point Likert scale 
(Field, 2005). 
3.6.2 Respondent characteristics 
Using SPSS, frequency tables and cross tabulations were generated to describe the data 
obtained from the respondent's. This enabled the identification of the characteristics of the 
respondents and patterns in the data These data manipulation techniques were conducted 
on responses to questions in Section 1 of the questionnaire. 
3.6.3 Ranking 0/ constraints 
Section n of the questionnaire sought to determine the perceptions of the respondents with 
regard to the relative importance of the identified constraints. 
The overall ranking of the constraints by the respondents was obtained by the mean score 
method (Chan et a/., 2003; Shaokai Lu et a/., 2007). The mean score (MS) for each 
constraint was calculated using the formulae 
Where 
MS=L (fX s) 
N 
f= frequency of response to each rating (1-5) for each constraint; 
s = Score given to each constraint by the respondents, ranging from 1 for 
Strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree; 
N = Number of responses to that constraint. 
Using the same method, rankings of the constraints are obtained among the various 
categories of the respondents as defined by the nature of organisation they work for. The 
weighting for the scale was scale 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor 
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disagree,2 disagree, 1 = strongly disagree. In cases of the occurrence ofa tie, a criterion 
for ranking was obtained based on the percentage of respondents strongly agreeing to the 
identified constraint. 
3.6.4 Kendall's coeffICient of concordance w 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance w analysis was done to measure the degree of 
agreement of the respondents within a category on their ranking of the constraints. The null 
hypothesis Ho and alternative hypothesis H/ respectively are, 
Ho = No agreement within the respondents in each group on their ranking of the 
constraints; 
H/ = there is agreement within the respondents in each group on their ranking of 
constraints 
If Kendall's coefficient of concordance (w) is significant at the 5% level, then an 
acceptable degree of consensus to the ranking of the constraints exists among the 
respondents in that category and the null hypothesis Ho is rejected (Siegel et al., 1988; 
Field, 2005). Kendall's coefficient of concordance (w) is in the range of 0 :s w :s I. 
Stronger degree of agreement is indicated by w being closer to one (Siegel et al., 1988; 
Field, 2005). 
3.6.5 Mann Whitney U test 
The Mann Whitney U test was done to determine whether the mean ranks for each 
constraint are equal between the government and private sector respondents. 
Ho = there is no difference between the mean ranks of the private and government sector 
respondents 
H/ = there is a difference between the mean ranks of the private and government sector 
respondents 
A P value lower than 0.05 on the Mann- Whitney U test serves to show that the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the mean ranks can be rejected indicating that there is 
a difference in perception between the respondents as regards the identified constraint 
(Siegel et al., 1988; Field, 2005). 
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The Mann Whitney U tests were conducted on the data obtained for Government and 
private sector respondents since these are considered the major actors in a public private 
partnership arrangement. 
3.6.6 Spearman rank co"eiation coefficient rll 
To compliment this, Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rJ test was done to measure 
the agreement between the two respondent groups on their ranking of constraints to the 
uptake of PPP in the electricity sector. 
Ho = there is no significant disagreement between the government and private sector 
respondents on the ranking of the constraints to PPP 
HI = there is significant disagreement between the government and private sector 
respondents on the ranking of the constraints to PPP 
An association in the rankings by the respondents is indicated by rs being significant at 
level of 0.05 i.e. if rs > 0.05, Hois accepted (Siegel et aI., 1988; Field, 2005). 
3.7 Ethical considerations 
The respondents where briefed about the purpose of the survey and their consent obtained 
before handing them the questionnaire for filling. In some instances especially in the 
government departments approval was required and obtained from a senior officer to 
administer the questionnaire to staff that are directly responsible for the development of the 
public private partnerships. Confidentiality was guaranteed to the respondents in the cover 
letter and the questionnaire was designed with no provision for entry of personal details to 
further facilitate the anonymity of the respondents. see (Eckhardt et al., 1977; Neuman, 
1994) for further discussion on this issue. 
3.8 Conclusion 
To attain the objective of identifying the importance of the factors that constrain the uptake 
and implementation of public private partnerships in the electricity sector, a literature 
review was undertaken to identify the constraints to implementation of PPP in the 
electricity sector. A Likert scale questionnaire was developed incorporating these 
constraints. Using the mean score method, the relative importance of these constraints in 
the Ugandan electricity sector was established from the stakeholders. Relationships in the 
data were determined by using nonparametric test in SPSS for data analysis. 
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The findings are limited to public private partnerships aimed at increasing the electricity 
generation capacity through the construction of hydropower facilities in Uganda. The 
findings provide insight into what factors are important when considering the 





The pmpose of this chapter is to present the resultslfmdings as obtained from the analysis 
techniques indicated in the previous chapter. It highlights the importance of the identified 
constraints in the Ugandan electricity sector. Non directional two tailed probability test 
results are reported at a significance level of 0.05. The implication and relevance of the 
findings presented in this chapter are discussed in relation to the literature review and 
research objectives in the subsequent chapter. 
The statistical package SPSS was used to carry out the following statistical tests 
i. Descriptive statistics i.e. frequency counts and cross tabulations 
ii. Reliability test - Cronbachs coefficient alpha 
iii. Kendall's coefficient of concordance w 
iv. Mann Whitney test 
v. Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs 
4.1 Data collection 
During the period from January to February 2007, a total of seventy one (71) 
questionnaires were distributed using the purposive sampling and snow balling techniques. 
An overall response rate of 59.2% was attained. The number of questionnaires distributed 
and received as per respondent category is indicated in Table 4.1 below. 
4.2 ReUabDity test 
Field, (2005) quoting Kline (1999) identifies that values ofCronbach's alpha a 2: 0.7 are an 
acceptable indication of the reliability of the scale with values considerably lower 
indicating unreliability of the scale. The value of Cronbach's alpha a = 0.8231 was 
obtained in the survey indicating good reliability of the Likert scale used. 
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Table 4. 2 Data collection and response rate 
Questionnaires Questionnaire 
Questionnaires Response 
Organisation answered rate 
sent out Received 
Completely 0/0 
1 Government 35 19 19 54.3 
2 Regulatory 75 
8 6 6 
Body 
3 Private Sector 16 9 9 56.3 
4 Energy 71.4 
7 5 5 
Professional 
5 Civil society 60.1 
5 3 3 
organisation 
Total 71 42 42 59.2 
Source: Survey data collected for this research 
4.3 Characteristics of the respondent 
4.3.1 Response rate and respondent categories 
As indicated above, a total of 42 questionnaires where returned representing a response 
rate of 59.2%. The categorisation of the respondents as per organisation they work for is 
shown in Table 4.1 below. As indicated, 45.2% and 21.4 % of the respondents worked for 
government bodies and private sector companies respectively. 
Table 4. 3: Respondent categories 
Organisation Frequency % of total respondents 
Government Body 19 45.2 
Regulatory Body 6 14.3 
Private Sector 9 21.4 
Energy Professional 5 11.9 
Civil society organisation 3 7.1 
42 100 
Source: Survey data coUected for Msc research 
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4.3.1 Emplo)"ml!nt dU,"/;o" in C''''I!llIlJrgliniSlifion 
As a function of \be largel group dl:Si rcd, all respondents sampled were senior manage~. 
lht majority 45.2% having workcd in their currelll organisation for belween 1-4 years. The 
resu lts show thaI 50% of the rcspondenL~ from the regulatory body have worlccd wilh the 
organisati oll for at least five years. 
Table 4. 4 Emplo)"menl duration In current orga ni ~a tion 
l"""" ..... 1o. (; ..... =a' ........, .. " .... '-' l.''''Sedt<) ~-......... , ~, ~, ( . .... y .... , ....... lI .. p .......... ....-110., .-. .-
" 36.8 50.0 55.6 40.0 66.1 45.2 ,. 31.6 50.0 44.4 20.0 33.3 35.7 
'" 15.8 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 9.5 IJ·lb 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ' .8 
t7-W S.J 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 4' , ., 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 . 
4.3.3 Work u:p~r;~IIu ill Ih" UglI" dll "/I!c/ricity st"l"/lJr 
As illustrllted in the pie chan below, 45.2,,". or tlle respondents illdicate a 5 to 8 years work 
experience in the electricity sector, 40.5,,". 1 10 4 years of work experience and only One 
respondent representillg 2.4% indicated Illat he had spent more than thirteen years wOrXlllg 
in the electricity sector in Uganda. A further breakdown of the years of experience 
dependin8 on the organisation worked for shows that the 36.8% and 83.3% of the 
government and private sector respondC1lts respectively have worked in the electrici ty 
sec tor for a pcriod of S t08 yeaN. On the olher hand the majority 66.7"/0 or llle civil sociely 
organisation responde llts Ilave had I to 4 years experience in tile Uganda electricity sector 
Table 4. 5: Worl< tXptri fnce in Uganda ., I~ctrlci ty seClor: responses 
Categorised per respondent organisation 
R<~I010-,- ~.- hr.!'.,· (.1.~*1«, (;0_., -. r ..... pn) !',GI.".,uI 1l'rJ=._ .. - ... 
." 31.6 '" " . "" '" .. ~ , 81.3 )3 .3 "" 33.3 ' _11 IO.~ ••• • •• •• ••• 
1.1-16 >3 •• ••  .. •• 
11 ·14 15.8 •• •• •• •• 
"1._ ~ , .. . .. , .. , .. '00 
• • SOtJree. SlIJVt:y data collected fo Msc.-esc reh 
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4.3.4 Wark rxpl'rimu. in 11, .... , .. crridl)' sector of U"O(ltu COlt lifT)' 
The . espondems were asked 10 indicate whelher Ihey h~vc worked in lhc clccl. ;e;ty seelO. 
of aflOlh." ool.lntf)'. the majority of the respondents thiMy eighl in nUl<lbcr representing 
(90.5%) rcJ.POoocd in the negative \0 this question. Four respondems tWO from the 
category of energy professional$ and one each rrom the government aud pri vate seelOr 
provided positive responsc.s to the question. The results are presented in tabk 4.4. 
Table4.6; \Vork up" ric n~c ill the elect ri~il y sector or ~no l her C<)un Ir)" 
lIesides Uganda 
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3.2 Data collection instrument 
A Likert scale style questionnaire was used for data collection. Arguments abound on 
whether a Likert scale is an ordinal or interval scale. Considered as an ordinal scale, there 
is no meaning attached to the difference or distances between two numbers on the scale 
unlike if considered as an interval scale (Siegel et a/., 1988; Jamieson, 2004). Jamieson 
(2004) further points out that though the categories with ordinal scales have a rank order to 
them, it cannot be assumed that the intervals between the values are the same. The nature 
of scale used is important as it determines what statistical processes can be used for 
analysis in order to get meaningful conclusions (Siegel et a/., 1988; Neuman, 1994; 
Jamieson, 2004). The Likert scale used for this research was ordinal. 
Used as an ordinal scale, Fellows and Liu (1997) identify the advantages of the Likert scale 
as: 
i. Allowing the researcher elicit peoples opinions i.e. extent of agreement or 
disagreement with a statement; 
ii. Enabling the production of hierarchies of preferences of the respondents; and, 
iii. Generating a hierarchy of preferences for different categories of respondents in the 
sampling space that can be compared. 
Some disadvantages have been identified with the use of questionnaires and these include 
limitation to use with only literate respondents, low response rates in some instances and 
challenges in their effective design. The advantages of questionnaire method for data 
collection and still underpinning its popularity are; it is cost effective, relatively easy to 
implement and ensures anonymity of the respondent (Neuman, 1994; Easterby et a/., 
2002). 
3.3 Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first section consisted of a combination of 
open and closed ended questions aimed at collecting information regarding the 
characteristics of the respondents. Open ended questions allow the respondent to provide 
there own answers where the researcher cannot with confidence anticipate all the probable 
responses to a question (Eckhardt et a/., 1977; Easterby et a/., 2002; Fellows et a/., 2003). 
Included in this section were questions regarding the kind and duration for which they have 
worked for the organisation, years of work experience in the electricity sector both in 
Uganda and elsewhere, experience with PPP projects? 
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The second section solicited their perception regarding the importance of twenty three 
constraints to the development and uptake of public private partnerships for hydropower 
generation as identified through the literature review. The second section was designed in a 
five point Likert scale with the respondents being asked to indicate their level of agreement 
or disagreement to the statements according to the following scale strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
Neuman (1994) states the need for the questions in a questionnaire to be tested for clarity 
and ability to deliver the intended meaning to the respondent. This is done on a small 
sample of respondents with similar characteristics as to those for whom the survey is 
intended. To check the suitability, clarity and appropriateness of the questions, drafts of the 
questionnaires were discussed with three government officials, two private sector company 
representatives and one energy professionaVconsultant all having experience with the 
development of hydropower projects through public private partnerships in Uganda. The 
questionnaire was subsequently refined before distributing to a wider group of respondents. 
A copy of the questionnaire is in appendix A 
3.4 Sampling 
The target population of the survey consisted of managerial level staff representing 
government ministries and departments, electricity regulatory body, private companies 
both those that have expressed interest or are involved in the PPP projects in the electricity 
sector, representative of civil society organisations and energy professionals e.g. energy 
consultants, researchers and specialist advisors e.g. lawyers working in organisations that 
are involved in the development ofPPPs. 
The Lack of a comprehensive reliable list of all participants in the development of 
hydropower projects through PPP necessitated the use of non random sampling techniques. 
The respondents were identified through purposive and "snowballing" sampling 
techniques. To use the purposive sampling technique, the researcher should use 
professional judgement to identify respondents who are knowledgeable in the subject area 
(Rea et al., 2005). For this research, the respondents were selected on the basis that their 
work experience with PPP projects provides them with sufficient knowledge to respond to 
the issues that will be raised in the questionnaire. With "Snowballing", a person contacted 
in an organisation recommends another either in the same or another organisation to whom 
the questionnaire can be administered (Rea et al., 2005). 
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3.5 Questionnaire administration 
A total of Seventy one (71) self administered questionnaires where delivered by hand to 
the identified possible respondents. Prior to delivering the questionnaire, the respondents 
were contacted by telephone to ensure their willingness to parti~ipate in the survey. The 
questionnaire had a cover letter indicating the objectives of the research and guaranteeing 
confidentiality to the respondent Sixteen (16) questionnaires where administered to 
respondents from the private companies involved in the development of PPP for 
hydropower generation, eight (8) questionnaires to all possible respondents from top level 
management of the electricity regulatory body, thirty five (35) questionnaires to various 
respondents from different government bodies I ministries. Seven (7) questionnaires to 
professionals! consultants involved with PPP projects, five (5) questionnaires to 
respondents from civil society organisations. 
Follow up visits to pick up or remind the respondents about the questionnaires were 
repeatedly done. To further encourage respondents and increase the response rate, it was 
made known to the respondents that the finding of the study could be availed to them on 
request. The process of data collection was done from January to February 2007. 
It was particularly a challenge to administer the questionnaire to the latter categories of 
energy professionals and civil society organisations because lack of coordination and 
knowledge about each others activities, secondly there was repeated failure to honour I 
agree to appointments previously set. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The data collected was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). The 
questionnaire was coded to enable entry into SPSS. The respondents where categorised 
into 5 groups depending on the organisation they work for. Response options C and F to 
Question l' "what kind of organisation worked do you work for?" were collapsed to form 
the category private sector and data obtained from respondents entered accordingly. 
Similarly the responses to number of years as requested in questions 2 and 4 were 
collapsed into 5 groups consisting of a range of four years each i.e. 1-4,5-8, 9-12, 13-16, 
17-20, 
Non parametric tests were chosen for the analysis of the data collected. Nonparametric 
tests are used when the data violates parametric. assumptions of normality and interval 
measured data (Siegel et al., 1988; Field, 2005). Non random sampling methods were used 
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for data collection, hence non- normally distributed and the data collected. was ordinal in 
nature. 
3.6.1 Reliability test 
Reliability of a scale can be viewed. in terms of stability i.e. the scales ability to elicit same 
responses when administered to the same respondent under similar circumstances and 
internal consistency which is concerned with the scales ability to measure the construct 
under investigation (Eckhardt et aI., 1977; Neuman, 1994). Cronbach's coefficient Alpha 
was determined and used as an indicator of the reliability of the five point Likert scale 
(Field, 2005). 
3.6.2 Respondent characteristics 
Using SPSS, frequency tables and cross tabulations were generated to describe the data 
obtained from the respondent's. This enabled. the identification of the characteristics of the 
respondents and patterns in the data. These data manipUlation techniques were conducted 
on responses to questions in Section 1 of the questionnaire. 
3.6.3 Ranking of constraints 
Section II of the questionnaire sought to determine the perceptions of the respondents with 
regard to the relative importance of the identified constraints. 
The overall ranking of the constraints by the respondents was obtained by the mean score 
method (Chan et aJ., 2003; Shaokai Lu et ai., 2007). The mean score (MS) for each 




f = frequency of response to each rating (1-5) for each constraint; 
s = Score given to each constraint by the respondents, ranging from 1 for 
Strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree; 
N = Number of responses to that constraint 
Using the same method, rankings of the constraints are obtained among the various 
categories of the respondents as defined by the nature of organisation they work for. The 
weighting for the scale was scale 5 strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor 
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disagree, 2 = disagree, I = strongly disagree. In cases of the occurrence of a tie, a criterion 
for ranking was obtained based on the percentage of respondents strongly agreeing to the 
identified constraint 
3.6.4 KeMaH's coefficient of concordance w 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance w analysis was done to measure the degree of 
agreement of the respondents within a category on their ranking of the constraints. The null 
hypothesis Ho and alternative hypothesis HJ respectively are, 
Ho = No agreement within the respondents in each group on their ranking of the 
constraints; 
HJ = there is agreement within the respondents in each group on their ranking of 
constraints 
If Kendall's coefficient of concordance (w) is significant at the 5% level, then an 
acceptable degree of consensus to the ranking of the constraints exists among the 
respondents in that category and the null hypothesis Ho is rejected (Siegel et al., 1988; 
Field, 2005). Kendall's coefficient of concordance (w) is in the range of 0 ::::; w ::::; 1. 
Stronger degree of agreement is indicated by w being closer to one (Siegel et al., 1988; 
Field, 2005). 
3.6.5 Mann Whitney U test 
The Mann Whitney U test was done to determine whether the mean ranks for each 
constraint are equal between the government and private sector respondents. 
Ho = there is no difference between the mean ranks of the private and government sector 
respondents 
HJ = there is a difference between the mean ranks of the private and government sector 
respondents 
A P value lower than 0.05 on the Mann- Whitney U test serves to show that the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the mean ranks can be rejected indicating that there is 
a difference in perception between the respondents as regards the identified constraint 
(Siegel et al., 1988; Field, 2005). 
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The Mann Whitney U tests were conducted on the data obtained for Government and 
private sector respondents since these are considered the major actors in a public private 
partnership arrangement. 
3.6.6 Spearman rank co"eiation coefficient r. 
To compliment this, Spearman rank correlation coefficient (raJ test was done to measure 
the agreement between the two respondent groups on their ranking of constraints to the 
uptake ofPPP in the electricity sector. 
Ho = there is no significant disagreement between the government and private sector 
respondents on the ranking of the constraints to PPP 
HI = there is significant disagreement between the government and private sector 
respondents on the ranking of the constraints to PPP 
An association in the rankings by the respondents is indicated by rs being significant at 
level of 0.05 i.e. if rs > 0.05, Ho is accepted (Siegel et al., 1988; Field, 2005). 
3.7 Ethical considerations 
The respondents where briefed about the purpose of the survey and their consent obtained 
before handing them the questionnaire for filling. In some instances especially in the 
government departments approval was required and obtained from a senior officer to 
administer the questionnaire to staff that are directly responsible for the development of the 
public private partnerships. Confidentiality was guaranteed to the respondents in the cover 
letter and the questionnaire was designed with no provision for entry of personal details to 
further facilitate the anonymity of the respondents. see (Eckhardt et al., 1977; Neuman, 
1994) for further discussion on this issue. 
3.8 Conclusion 
To attain the objective of identifying the importance of the factors that constrain the uptake 
and implementation of public private partnerships in the electricity sector, a literature 
review was undertaken to identify the constraints to implementation of PPP in the 
electricity sector. A Likert scale questionnaire was developed incorporating these 
constraints. Using the mean score method, the relative importance of these constraints in 
the Ugandan electricity sector was established from the stakeholders. Relationships in the 
data were determined by using nonparametric test in SPSS for data analysis. 
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The findings are limited to public private partnerships aimed at increasing the electricity 
generation capacity through the construction of hydropower facilities in Uganda. The 
findings provide insight into what factors are important when considering the 





The purpose of this chapter is to present the results/findings as obtained from the analysis 
techniques indicated in the previous chapter. It highlights the importance of the identified 
constraints in the Ugandan electricity sector. Non directional two tailed probability test 
results are reported at a significance level of 0.05. The implication and relevance of the 
findings presented in this chapter are discussed in relation to the literature review and 
research objectives in the subsequent chapter. 
The statistical package SPSS was used to carry out the following statistical tests 
i. Descriptive statistics i.e. frequency counts and cross tabulations 
ii. Reliability test - Cronbachs coefficient alpha 
iii. Kendall's coefficient of concordance w 
iv. Mann Whitney test 
v. Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs 
4.1 Data collection 
During the period from January to February 2007, a total of seventy one (71) 
questionnaires were distributed using the purposive sampling and snow balling techniques. 
An overall response rate of 59.2% was attained. The number of questionnaires distributed 
and received as per respondent category is indicated in Table 4.1 below. 
4.2 Reliability test 
Field, (2005) quoting Kline (1999) identifies that values ofCronbach's alpha a ~ 0.7 are an 
acceptable indication of the reliability of the scale with values considerably lower 
indicating unreliability of the scale. The value of Cronbach's alpha a = 0.8231 was 
obtained in the survey indicating good reliability of the Likert scale used. 
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Table 4. 2 Data collection and response rate 
Questionnaires Questionnaire 
Questionnaires Response 
Organisation answered rate 
sent out Received 
Completely % 
1 Government 35 19 19 54.3 
2 Regulatory 75 
8 6 6 
Body 
3 Private Sector 16 9 9 56.3 
4 Energy 71.4 
7 5 5 
Professional 
5 Civil society 60.1 
5 3 3 
organisation 
Total 71 42 42 59.2 
Source: Survey data coHected for this research 
4.3 Characteristics of the respondent 
4.3.1 Response rate and respondent categories 
As indicated above, a total of 42 questionnaires where returned representing a response 
rate of 59.2%. The categorisation of the respondents as per organisation they work for is 
shown in Table 4.1 below. As indicated, 45.2% and 21.4 % of the respondents worked for 
government bodies and private sector companies respectively. 
Table 4. 3: Respondent categories 
Organisation Frequency 0/. of total respondents 
Government Body 19 45.2 
Regulatory Body 6 14.3 
Private Sector 9 21.4 
~ Professional 5 11.9 
society organisation 3 7.1 
42 100 
Source: Survey data collected for Msc research 
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4. J. ] ""'III<I)'",~'" duru{;"" ;11 l'urr~'" fJrgi"';~'U';<l1I 
As a function of the target group desired, all respondcnts samplcd were senior lIlanagcn;. 
lhe major]l)' 45.2% ha ving workL'<l in lheir eUtn'fl1 organisation for between 1·4 ),CaD. The 
resolts show thai 50"10 of the respondents from the regulatory hody have worked with the 
organisation for 1Itle351 fi>-e years. 
Employm~nl duralion in eunnt organisation 
h..-1lY Chfl!iMl<l)' 
rIO'" ,io .. t o-v."-,IM 
5.3 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 4.' 
As iIIustralcd in the pic clw1 below. 45.2% "fthe: respondents ind icale I S 10 8 ycal"$ work 
~~perieI'lCC in tile electricity sector, 40.5% 1 to 4 years of work experience Ind only one 
respondent representing Vlo/" indic.oled that be had iipCnt more than thi rlcen ye:us working 
in tile electricity sector in Uganda. A fOrlher breakdown of Ihe years of I:l!pcricncc 
depending on the organisation worked fOf shows Ihal the 36.8"/. and 83.3% of the 
govCTTImc nl and private sector respondenl.'l respective ly lIa\"e wDlked in the electricity 
sector for n period of 5 t08 years. On the o ther lland the mnjority 66.7% of the civil !iOC1ely 
organisation respondents 113ve had I to 4 years experience in the Uganda electricilY $eClor 
Table 4. 5: Work up"rlence In Ug,wnda elcclrlchy seclor : responses 
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The rcspondenls were asked 10 indicau: ... 'hcthcr !hey ha"e ..... OItcd in the ckcuicity SCCIOr 
or anolMr eountl)', the rnIIjoril)' or the respondenlS thiny cighl in number representing 
(90.St.) responded in the ncgal"'e 10 Ih" qUCSl10n F{)UI" te$pondenlli two from (he 
catcgOl)' o r Ml'"'Tg)l professionals and one each rrOfTl the: government and private SCCIOr 
pro" idcd positi\<e responses 10 lhe qUC5tion. The resullS are presented III table 4.4. 
T able 4. 6: Work up«lrn~t In tht electricity K't lnr Dr aaalhtr counlry 
besidH Uganda 
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4.1.5 Work e,rfW,lellrf' III urlO~ ttlh", Ihon Ihe electricity serlor 
Table 4.4 surmooriscs the findi ngs for the responscs to qucstion 7 regarding worl: 
cxpericnces In scctOI1l OIher than the cltttricilY sc.;tor. The majority of thc respondentS 
(76.2%) indicatc<l prior npcriencc in OIlier seerOI1l. It is observed from table 4.4 that 
33.3% of the respondents from Ihc regulatory authority have had npcricnce in thc 
education sedor as academicians at higher institutions of learning while 42 .1 'Y. of the 
govCTTun<:nr respoml<:nts have nn work cxpcrieocc outside the electricity sc.;tor. 
It is further noted that 19"10. representing the IT\IIjoril)' of the respondents have had prior 
c~pcricncc in the r.tLance sector with the education at !4.)'l-. being thc next largest sector 
where tile responocnlll twd previously been employed. Only 2.4% of the respondents had 
bI:ro employed eoch in eitllcr the tdooommunieations Or health seeror. 
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Respondents were required to indicillc any work experience Wi th PPP prior 10 their curren! 
posting or IIssignment. A total of SQ"'" oflhe respondents; had worl:cd On PPP projects prior 
10 their curren! assignment s. In addition 31 ,"0 of those with cxpcriellCc having oblained it 
itt the various I'PI' ini tiatives itt the energy seclor lhough undcr different jobslassignrncnts. 
Signiticant 10 note is thlll 81S.9"1. of IbI: private seclor respondents indicated that this was 
tlleir first cxperiellCc III developing hydropower genennion fllcilit;i!S through public private 
panncll-hips with 52.6% Qfthe go\·cmmcnt sa:tor respondents having no prior experience. 
'" 
T~hle 4. 8: El<pcrience whh public private panncrships 
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4.4 KndaU', eC!tffidtnl or ron(ord~nee w 
Kendall's oocmdent of concordance (w) for tile ranki ng of the constraints among all 
respondents is 0.23 I; among the (jo,'cmment Seclor rc:s.pondems is 0.328, 0.491 among the 
regulatory ~tor respondents. and 0.365 IIlTtOng the privllte S«lor respondents and 0.318 
for energy professional respoodents. These Kendalrs coeffICients of concordancc an: all 
signiftclnl It the 0.05 level and there fon: it can be concluded that thl!fc is m rc:lS(>DlIblc 
degree of agreement among the =pondents in each of these group and all respondents 
regarding the TlInking of lhe cOlllitfll ints 10 Public private partnerships in the ek'<:tricity 
s«tor. Kendall's coefflC>cnt of ooocordance w is 0.371 al a significaoce level of 0.321 for 
the respondent y, ithin the civil soc>cty orgaolsation category. 
4,5 Ranking of roO.'ilninlS 
The ranking ofth!: Importance of the oonstnllnts by the different categories together with 
the mipcc1h'e Kendall's coefficient of OODcordance m: indicated in tile lable 4.7. 
Ov('fllll the respondents idenhfied "the rclucWlCe of IOCII mstitutiollS 10 provide equi ty 
flllllllcing" as being !be number one constraint alld ~R'Slndion 10 the k,'cl of foreign 
owocrsh.p of oompanics" as the least constraint to the uptake IIJId Implementation or ppp 
for the dl'\"t~lopmenl of h)·t\ropowl.'f gcncratioll facilities lD Uganda. 
All rcspondcn15l"1lrlked the constraints '"rCSiStalKC from en.,lI011mclllal groups~.nd"pDOf 
~"OOrdlDatloo bct"'cen government <kpartmen15H among the top tCII cOllStralDlS. 
E~propria\lon concerns in form of governments flil llre 10 honour ~ontnlC1S ... 1$ IlOI 
considered as a 51gnllicatlt OOfISlflllntlO the den'lopmmt of rubll~ prival~ partnership$. 
" 
The respondents with the exception of those from the private sector, ranked lack of an 
enabling regulatory environment among the last five constraints though there was general 
consensus to its mid ranking as a constraint for its lack of clarity and ambiguity. The 
ranking is further examined in chapter five of this thesis. 
4.6 Mann Whitney U tests 
The Mann Whitney U tests as conducted on the data obtained for Government and private 
sector respondents is shown in table 4.8 below. These tests compare the perception of the 
Government sector and private sector respondents as to the importance of the identified 
constraints. The results of the Mann Whitney test show that there is a general consensus of 
perception as regards the importance of the identified constraints to the implementation of 
public private partnerships (0.01:S p :s 0.93 at 5% significance level). However there is a 
difference in perception between the two groups i.e. (p < 0.05) with regard to "Lack of an 
enabling environment", "Weak regulatory environment lacking in clarity and ambiguous", 
for both p = 0.02, "Slow implementation of power sector reforms" and "investor concerns 
of foreign exchange risk" both with p = 0.01; "restrictions to level of foreign ownership of 
companies" and "reluctance of local institutions to provide equity financing" having 
p=0.04 and 0.03 respectively. 
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Table 4 .1: Ra • f nking 0 constralDts to Publi p. c nvate h' P artners iPS 
Regulatory Energy 
AD respondents Government PrIvate sector Body Professionals CSO 
Constraint Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Inability oflocal Institutions to provide equity fInancing 4.17 I 3.74 4 4.78 I 4.67 I 4.40 2 3.67 3 
Resistance from Environmental groups 3.83 2 3.79 2 3.78 6 4.33 2 3.80 6 3.33 5 
Poor coordination between Government departments 3.69 3 3.37 6 4.33 2 3.33 8 4.00 5 4.00 2 
Delays as a result oflengthy bureaucratic procedures 3.67 4 3.74 5 4.11 4 3.33 7 4.00 4 2.00 19 
Many requirements to obtain project approval 3.55 5 3.84 1 4.22 3 2.67 13 3.40 13 1.67 21 
Lengthy project approval process 3.45 6 3.79 3 4.11 5 2.33 16 3.40 12 1.67 20 
Political Interference in procurement process 3.29 7 2.63 11 3.56 9 3.67 4 4.80 1 3.33 5 
Low level of skills of personnel Involved with PPP 3.21 8 3.11 7 3.33 10 2.50 14 3.80 7 4.00 1 
Poor creditworthiness of power off taker 3.07 9 3.05 8 2.89 17 3.67 3 3.40 10 2.00 18 
Resistance from Civil society organisations 3.02 10 3 9 3.11 16 3.00 9 3.40 11 2.33 15 
Investors concerns for need of intensive managerial resources 2.90 11 2.89 10 3.11 13 2.83 10 3.00 19 2.33 14 
Lack of political will and support 2.86 12 2.21 18 2.89 18 3.33 6 4.20 3 3.67 4 
Accusations of corruption and corrupt tendencies 2.71 13 2.47 12 2.78 19 2.83 II 3.60 9 2.33 16 
Weak regulatory framework lacking in clarity and ambiqous 2.71 14 2.42 14 3.67 8 1.67 22 3.20 16 3.00 11 
Investors concerns of foreign exchange risk 2.64 15 2.11 20 3.11 12 3.50 5 3.00 18 2.33 12 
Restrictions on the return on investment 2.64 16 2.47 13 3.11 16 2.50 15 2.80 21 2.33 17 
Public resentment as a result of tariff increases 2.60 17 2.32 IS 3.11 14 2.17 17 3.00 20 3.00 8 
Lack ofindependence of regulatory body 2.57 18 2.16 19 2.78 20 2.83 12 3.20 IS 3.00 10 
Slow implementation of power sector reforms 2.57 19 2.26 16 3.67 7 1.67 21 3.40 14 1.67 22 
Lack of enabling legal framework 2.45 20 2.21 17 2.44 23 2.00 18 3.60 8 3.00 7 
Lack of an enabling regulatory framework 2.40 21 2.11 21 3.22 11 2.00 19 3.20 17 1.33 23 
Failure of government to honour its contract obJigations 2.14 22 1.95 22 2.56 22 1.83 20 2.40 22 2.33 13 
Restrictions to the level offoreign ownership of companies 2.05 23 1.79 23 2.67 21 1.33 23 2.20 23 3.00 9 
Kendall's eoeffteient of eoneordanee w 0.231 0.328 0.365 0.491 0.318 0.371 
Level of Sismifieanee 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.321 
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Table 4. 10: Mann Whlhlf) U Its l 
Mran ibnk 
C ... sll'1li.1li .... ~ ........ -~ MIIM • Whitney U .... Lack of an ~nabhn& UILIIIlOf)' 
fruJnc".-ork 12.21 19.33 0.02 
Wc:al reculaory rr:llne"'OflIOidong 
,n clOln,y and ambiguous. 12.00 1978 002 
Slow ,~kmenlation ofpowef" 
~dQr n:forml. 11.91 19.83 00' 
Lack ofilKkpm<knc~ ofn:guhllory 
body 12.95 11.78 011 
Mlny requin:menls 10 obtain project 
appflW.t 13.63 1633 OJ9 
Lnlgthy I'fOJttl approval procus 1371 16.71 0.43 
R~liOl\5 on the rerum on 
in'·cstrllClll. 12.79 18.1 J 0.93 
Re$lricl;Ons 10 t~ level of foreign 
owocrship of cornplllli~ •. 12,47 18.78 0.04 
J'OOI coordination between 
Govern,"c'" dcpanmcnlS. 12.63 18.44 007 
J)days 15.1 n:~ull ortcn81hy 
bureaucratic proctdUfe5. 13.)9 16.83 0 27 
Low Jc"eI ohldll j of personnel 
Inl'OlI'ed with 1'1'1' 14.03 15.5 0.64 
ACCU$allOOs of CORl/phon and 
corrupt tendenciu. 13.84 \5.89 0,51 
Resistancc from Enlilfonmc:ntal 
11001'$. 1487 13.72 0.70 
Resi!ilance from CtVillOCiely 
Oflanisations. 14.37 14.78 090 
I'ubhc n:scn.lmcnl. a ruull ofWiff 
incrc:ucs. 12.76 18.11 008 
InvalOn COD\:o;t1\$ fOr need of 
,ntawlc IMft3genal n:SlUft"I:s. 14.1l 15.28 0.12 
Puh...,.,1 InlQfa~n.:c in procuremcnt ,....... 12.50 18.72 OOS 
Lao;k of pohtical will and support. \3.00 17.67 0.14 
llle. ofc:nabhng legal framework 1l.63 16J3 0.37 
h.lun: ofl!(lvemmenltO honour ilJ 
(Onlrlle! obligations. 12.89 17.89 0. 11 
J nl'Cltou COIIf;:m1S of fon:ign 
uchange nst... 11.97 19.83 0.0 1 
Inability of lo<:al l l\5UIII110115 to 
pro~Kk equity finanCing. 12.29 19 !7 0.03 
1'001 cr<:t!,lworthlOCSS of power off 
laker. 14.68 14.1\ 0.86 
• ... 
4.7 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
Spearman's correlation coefficient tests whether there is agreement between the private 
and government sector respondent as to the ranking of constraints. The correlation 
coefficient (rs) of the ranking of the constraints is 0.717 for private and government sector 
respondents (Table 4.9). Therefore the null hypothesis of no significant disagreement 
between the private and government sector respondents on the ranking of the constraints to 
private sector investment in the Uganda electricity sector has to be accepted. Implying with 
99% confidence that there is significant agreement on the ranking of constraints between 
the private and government sector respondents 
Table 4. 11: Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
Government Private 
Government rs 1.000 0.717 
Significance NS 0.000 
Private rs 0.717 1.000 
Significance 0.000 NS 
Source: Survey data collected for Msc research 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented findings from the analysis of data obtained through the 
questionnaire interviews. A response rate of 59.2% was obtained for the survey. Findings 
indicate 45.2 % of the respondents have worked for 5-8 years in the Uganda electricity 
sector with 50 % of the respondents having had prior work experience in the development 
of public private partnership. 
With reasonable agreement (Kendall's w = 0.231 significant at 5%), the respondents rank 
failure to access equity fmancing from local financial institutions as being the major 
constraint to the development of PPP. Of least importance is the restriction to level of 
foreign ownership of companies intending to partner with the government for purposes of 
developing hydropower generation facilities. Divergence in perception of the importance 
of certain constraints is observed when the ranking by the respondents is subjected to the 
Mann Whitney and Kruskal - Wallis test. Spearman's rank correlation shows a strong 
relationship between the ranking of constraints by the government and private sector 
respondents. 
The next chapter will present the discussion of these findings in relation to the research 
questions and literature review. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the discussion of the results obtained in relation to the literature 
review and research questions. It begins by examining the respondent characteristics, then 
the ranking of the identified constraints with respect to importance as perceived by the 
respondents. The final section of the chapter develops the strategies and measures that 
could be used to mitigate the identified constraints. 
5.1 Discussion of survey results 
5.1.1 Response rate and respondent categories 
From Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 it is observed that the number of respondents to whom 
questionnaires were administered for the categories energy professional (Consultants, 
researchers and lawyers) is low compared to other respondents. This is attributed to the 
lack of awareness of each other's activities; a hindrance that was encountered during the 
data collection stage of this research. This illustrates a shortcoming of the "Snowballing" 
method for sampling. However using the same sampling method, it was possible to reach a 
large group of the government and private sector respondent within the data collection 
period. 
The overall response rate of 59.2% is considered sufficient and compares favourably with 
studies that have used a similar sampling approach in similar studies e.g. 58 % (Shaokai Lu 
el 01.,2007) and 12 % (Bing Li el 01.,2005) 
5.1.2 Employment duration in CUlTent organisation 
As a function of the target group desired, all respondents sampled were senior managers in 
their respective organisations, with the majority (45.2%) having worked in their current 
organisation for between 1-4 years. Table 4.2 shows that half of the respondents from the 
regulatory organisation have been employed by the body for at least five years, implying 
that they have been with the organisation since its inception in 2000. 
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5.1.3 Work experience in the Uganda electricity sector 
From Table 4.3, it was deduced that a majority (45.2%) of the respondents have 5 to 8 
years work experience in the electricity sector. These figures indicate the existence of staff 
with considerable experience in the electricity sector and by implication, a good 
understanding of the workings and challenges of the sector. 
A significant finding from the responses to the question on work experience presented as 
per respondent organisation is that 42.1 % of the government sector respondents indicated 
no previous work experience in other sectors. This could mean that a significant number of 
the government sector respondents are career civil servants in the energy sector. It can 
further be concluded that the possible benefits that would have occurred from direct work 
experience obtained from another country, are not there as deduced from the result in 
Table 4.4 which shows that only 4 respondents (9.52%) have work experience in the 
electricity sector of another country 
5.1.4 Experience with public private partnerships 
The results from the responses to this question proffer insights into the use of PPPs to 
increase the hydropower generation capacity in Uganda. Overall 50% of the respondents 
had no prior experience with use of public private partnership for the delivery of public 
infrastructure. It can also be noted that 88.9% of the private sector respondents indicated 
that besides their current undertaking, they had no prior experience with the development 
of public private partnerships. In reality, the presence of firms with little previous 
experience in PPPs could be indicative of the possibility that many of the companies were 
formed in response to the incentives offered by government in form of subsidises, in the 
quest to develop the Mini and Micro hydropower stations across the country (MoEMD, 
2001). Moreover the use of PPP's is a relatively new concept in the in the Uganda 
electricity sector. 
S.2 Ranking of constraints 
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance w (w = 0.231 significant at a= 0.000) established a 
reasonable degree of agreement among the respondents with regard to the overall ranking 
of the constraints to implementation and uptake of public private partnerships. On 
assessing the perception of the respondents as classified in the different categories of 
government sector, private sector, regulatory body, energy professionals and civil society 
organisation respondents, it was observed that the values of Kendall's Coefficient of 
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Concordance w were increased. This indicates that a stronger agreement on ranking was 
achieved in the different groups separately. 
The respondents' overall ranking of the reluctance by financial institutions to provide debt 
or equity financing as the number one constraint highlights the difficulties encountered in 
obtaining financing for PPP projects. Access to and reliability of financing especially from 
local financial institutions helps mitigate a number of risks e.g. foreign exchange risk and 
effects of currency devaluation. The difficulty in raising financing correlates with the 
significant constraint to private sector participation in power infrastructure development in 
developing countries identified in the literature review (Jyoti et 01., 1998; ADB, 2000; 
Sader, 2000), and public private partnerships generally (Akerele et 01.,2003). 
The respondents ranking of "pressure from environmental groups" as the second most 
significant constraint to the development of hydropower stations through the PPP route is 
clearly reflective of the situation in Uganda. Environmentalists have been opposed to and 
instrumental in the delayed take off of a number of proposed proj ects, the most outstanding 
being the Budjagali hydropower station. This has been as a result of insufficient 
consideration of environmental impact concerns by the project promoters (Sasha, 2003; 
World Bank, 2007). In order to address the environmentalists' concerns, it is now a 
requirement for project promoters to present an environmental impact assessment report 
approved by NEMA before obtaining a licence to develop a hydropower plant (Electricity 
Act, 1999; MoEMD, 2001). 
Furthermore, delays resulting from the bureaucratic nature of the institutional system are a 
significant constraint. The delays in obtaining the necessary project approvals are a major 
barrier to attracting private sector participation in the power sector in developing countries 
(Sader, 2000); China (Blackman et 01., 1999), India (Jyoti et 01., 1998; Antonette et 01., 
1999) and were identified as a significant issue in investors decision whether or not to 
invest in a country (Lamech et aI., 2003). The delays also increase the transaction costs 
involved in the project development phase and thus act as a disincentive to project 
promoters. 
From the overall ranking of constraints, the respondents express satisfaction with the 
regulatory and legal frameworks. This is indicated by low ranking of "lack of enabling 
legal framework" (ranked 20), "lack of enabling regulatory framework" (ranked 21) and 
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the related item of "lack of independence of the regulatory body" (ranked 18). The 
satisfaction with a conducive regulatory and legal framework is in line with the findings of 
a previous study, (Engorait, 2004), which demonstrated that the regulatory and legal 
frameworks were adequate to attract private sector participation in the sector. 
Confidence in the Ugandan government's policy encouraging private sector participation is 
further illustrated with the respondents' low ranking of "failure of government to honour 
its contract obligation," (ranked 22). This confidence may he attributed to government's 
continued expression of its commitment to developing a number of hydropower projects as 
PPPs both in policy documents (Electricity Act, 1999; MoEMD, 2001; MoMED, 2002) 
and in public statements. Investor's confidence has further been boosted by the willingness 
of the regulatory body to increase electricity tariffs (Engorait, 2004) even amidst public 
expressions of displeasure. These acts provide credibility to the government's willingness 
to enforce contract obligations as stipulated by the legal and regulatory frameworks and 
lessen investor perception of risk in a given institutional environment (ADB, 2000) 
However, with regard to "lack in clarity of the regulatory framework," while other 
respondents ranked it beyond the top ten, the private sector respondents ranked it eighth in 
terms of importance as a constraint to implementation and uptake of PPPs. The perceived 
lack of clarity of the regulatory framework could he as a result of the many government 
departments they have to deal with during the project preparation phase (REB, 2006). This 
possibility is further supported by their high ranking as a constraint of the item ''poor 
coordination between government department" (ranked 2). To resolve this constraint, it is 
suggested that a unit to which private investors should make their submissions be set up 
either within the regulatory agency or ministry. This unit should specifically deal with the 
implementation of public private partnership projects. 
The government and private sector respondents ranked among the top five the items, 
"many requirements to obtain project approval." and "lengthy project approval process." 
This is unlike the other categories of respondents who ranked both items beyond the top 
ten constraints to the development of public private partnerships in the electricity sector. 
The greater level of importance attached to these items by the government and private 
sector respondents could be as a result of the greater level of interaction between the two 
groups during the project preparation stages and an indication of the shared belief that 
there are too many procedural requirements thus making the process unnecessarily long. 
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On the other hand the regulatory body maybe unwilling to attach great importance as a 
constraint to the procedural requirements of which they are initiators and custodians. 
Though corruption and accusations of corruption have been touted as significant factors 
that have affected the development and implementation of public private partnerships in 
the Uganda electricity sector (Sasha, 2003; Engorait, 2004; Bbumba, 2006; Mbendi, 2006), 
the respondents did not take the items as important. Indeed, the item was not ranked highly 
and therefore was not perceived as a significant constraint. It is possible that the 
respondents might have deliberately misrepresented their opinion on the importance of this 
constraint in order not to portray the sector unfavourably; a handicap of the survey as a 
research method identified by (Leedy et al., 2005) when he states that at times the 
respondents might misrepresent facts in order to present a favourable impression on the 
researcher . 
Low levels of skills by personnel involved with PPP have been identified as an unattractive 
feature of PPPs and a constraint to development and implementation thereof. This is 
brought about by PPP being a relatively new concept in many developing countries and the 
small number of projects so far undertaken (Moreldge et al., 1998; Bing Li et al., 2005). 
A similar view was expressed by the respondents to this survey who identified "low level 
of skills of personnel involved with PPP" among the top ten constraints (ranked 8), to the 
development of PPPs in the electricity sector in Uganda. 
Interestingly while all categories of respondents ranked "low level of skills of personnel 
involved with PPP" among the top ten, the respondents from the regulatory body ranked it 
14. This difference in ranking can be attributed to the fact that the respondents from this 
category have undergone training with regard to the development of PPPs; a fact that was 
brought to light in the researcher's interaction with these respondents. To harness the 
benefits of this and increase the knowledge base with regard to PPPs, it is recommended 
that their counterparts from the government sector undergo similar training. 
A restriction to the level of foreign. ownership of companies is identified as the least 
significant constraint to private sector participation in the power sector by all respondents. 
The results suggest that Uganda as intended by the power sector reforms is operating a 
liberalised electricity sector where foreign direct investment is being encouraged 
(Electricity Act, 1999; MoEMD, 2002). This is evidenced by the fact that all companies 
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currently in some form of partnership with the government are fully foreign owned 
(Engorait, 2004; World Bank, 2007). 
5.3 Differences in perception. 
The Mann Whitney tests were conducted responses obtained from government and private 
sector participants to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in 
perception between the two categories. These two categories were considered the key 
players in the development of public private partnerships. 
The results from the Mann Whitney tests indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference in perception between the government and private sector respondents with 
regard to the importance of the following constraints: 
i. Lack of an enabling regulatory framework; 
ii. Weak regulatory :framework lacking in clarity and ambiguous; 
iii. Slow implementation of power sector reforms; 
iv. Restrictions to the level of foreign ownership of companies; 
v. Investors concerns of foreign exchange risk; and 
vi. Inability of local institutions to provide equity financing. 
The mean rank values for private sector are all higher than the government sector 
respondents indicating that the former category considers the above factors more important 
as constraints to the implementation and uptake of projects through public private 
partnerships than the latter. 
In relation to items 1 of Part B of the questionnaire i.e. "lack of an enabling regulatory 
environment," the Z ratio for the above item is -2.30 with an observed significance of 0.02. 
The mean ranks for the two respondent groups on this item are private sector (19.33) and 
government sector (12.21). The results suggest that the private sector puts much more 
weight on the presence of a regulatory environment that favours private sector participation 
and is therefore more sensitive to any shortcomings in the regulatory :framework. This view 
is similar to that available in literature (Sader, 2000; Fraser, 2005; Woodhouse, 2005; 
William et ai., 2006). 
Similarly for item 2 "weak regulatory environment lacking in clarity and ambiguous," the 
mean ranks are private sector (19.78) and government sector (12.00). The significance is 
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0.02 and Z ratio for the item is -2.44. This further illustrates a higher sensitivity by the 
private sector respondents to inadequacies in the regulatory environment. 
The perception of the private sector and government sector respondents also statistically 
differed on the item "slow implementation of power sector reforms," with the private 
sector respondents more conscious of this factor as a constraint to the implementation of 
PPPs. From Table 4.8, it is observed that the level of significance is 0.01; the mean ranks 
are 19.83 and 11.91 for the private and government sector respondents respectively. The Z-
ratio on this item -2.48. 
The difference in roles when structuring a PPP is illustrated in the difference in perception 
between the key players i.e. the private and public sector on the factors of "investors 
concern for foreign exchange risk" and "inability of local financial institutions to provide 
financing". Private sector respondents show more awareness of these two factors as 
constraints to the implementation of PPPs compared to their counterparts in the public 
sector. The Mann Whitney Test (Table 4.8) supports this view. Meanwhile, "investors 
concern for foreign exchange risk" Z ratio is -2.54 and mean ranks are private sector 
(19.83) and government (11.97). Similarly for the item "inability of local financial 
institutions to provide financing" Z ratio is -2.24 and mean ranks are private sector (19.17) 
and government (12.29). The greater awareness exhibited by the private sector respondents 
of the above two mentioned factors stems from the greater responsibility they have to 
structure the project financing and ensure viability and profitability of the venture. As 
discussed in the literature (ADB, 2000; Sader, 2000), foreign exchange risk is of concern 
to investors as it directly impacts on their returns (profit). 
5.4 Summary 
In way of a summary, the following are highlighted as significant findings from the survey 
results discussion given above: 
i. Inability to access local fmancing is the major constraint to the development of 
public private partnerships for the development of hydropower projects in Uganda; 
ii. Insufficient consideration by project promoters to environmental aspects of the 
project has been a significant reason for delay in uptake and implementation of 
public private partnerships in the electricity sector. This fact has been 
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demonstrated by the resistance from environmental groups encountered on a 
number of proposed projects; 
iii. Lack of prior experience in the development and implementation of public private 
partnerships by the stakeholders has also hamstrung the development of PPPs in the 
electricity sector. This is further exacerbated by the fact that despite it being a 
government policy and initiative, there is no stated. policy on training of its own 
staff; 
iv. There is a general perception especially among the key players (private and 
government sector) in the development of PPPs that the procedural requirements 
are cumbersome and unnecessarily lengthen the process. The situation is 
aggravated by the large number of government departments the private sector has 
to deal with in the process and the associated bureaucracy; and 
v. The regulatory and legal frameworks that have been developed and are being 
implemented are attractive to private sector participation in the electricity sector. 
5.5 Strategies and measures 
From the findings of the research, it is recommended that the following measures be 
adopted to facilitate speedy implementation and uptake of PPPs 
Emphasis on environmental and socia' impact assessment 
To facilitate speedy uptake and implementation of public private partnerships in the 
electricity sector, it is suggested that the project promoters undertake in-depth 
environmental and social impact studies. The studies should address all possible effects of 
the project and suggest measures to mitigate the adverse effects. Adherence to both 
national and international guidelines is a must. Discussions with the relevant stakeholders 
e.g. environmentalists should be held and their concerns addressed at this stage. This could 
render proposed project more acceptable to both the local population and financers (both 
local and international) thus avoiding many unnecessary delays. 
Training of slIll/ 
Personnel from the regulatory body and public sector should undergo training in the 
different aspects of public private partnerships e.g. identification of suitable projects, 
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incentivising the private sector, negotiation, financial evaluation and structuring of public 
private partnership deals. Furthermore, on job experience through staff exchange 
programme initiatives with countries implementing PPPs would bring on much needed 
practical experience 
Establishing a PPP unit 
It is also suggested that the creation of a specialised unit within either the regulatory body 
but preferably in the energy sector line ministry would facilitate a faster development of 
PPP projects. The unit whose m~date would be to oversee the development and 
implementation of PPP would inter alia eliminate the need for private sector partners' 
interaction with a myriad of government agencies to get one project moving. It is important 
that the unit has well trained staff and be facilitated adequately in order to retain good 
quality personneL Depending on the number of projects undertaken, expertise with PPP 
would be developed and thus be possible to transfer this to other sectors should the need 
arise. 
Process map development 
The identification above of the relative importance of the constraints to the development 
and implementation of public private partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector as 
perceived by the stakeholders provides useful information that can be used in the 
development of a process map to guide the development and implementation of public 
private partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector. 
Development of PPP guidelines 
Finally from the lessons learnt in the electricity sector in addition to those from other 
infrastructural sectors and drawing from international experience in the development and 
implementation of public private partnerships, it is suggested that guidelines for the use of 
public private partnerships for infrastructural development in Uganda be developed and 
refined as the use ofPPPs continues to grow. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the survey results in respect to the literature and 
presented a summary of the discussion in which failure to access local financing, pressure 
from environmentalists, lengthy and cumbersome procedural requirements, ,lack of 
experience and knowledge in the development PPPs were highlighted as significant 
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constraints. The survey results showed respondents' general satisfaction with the ability of 
the regulatory regime and legal framework to attract private sector participation in the 
electricity sector through public private partnerships. The results also illustrated the fact 
that compared to the government sector, the private sector is more conscious of the 
shortcomings of the regulatory and financial environment with respect to the 
implementation of public private partnerships. The findings led to suggestions of measures 
and strategies that could be implemented to mitigate the constraints. These included 
training of personnel, stringent adherence to environmental and social impact assessment, 
the creation of a PPP unit, development of a process map for PPP implementation in the 
electricity sector and finally guidelines to the use ofPPP for infrastructural development. 
The following chapter presents the main findings of this research and examines the extent 
to which the research questions were answered and research objectives achieved. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the findings in relation to the research questions are presented. An 
assessment is made on whether the objectives of the research were achieved. Finally 
conclusions are drawn from the research findings and recommendations made. 
The research problem was stated in chapter one as: 
Despite the potential of Public Private Partnership to enhance the delivery of physical 
infrastructure, failure to attain deal closure on many proposed projects hinders their 
implementation. 
And the Research question: 
How can the process of delivery of hydropower generation facilities through Public 
Private Partnerships be enhanced? 
The findings with respect to the subsidiary questions formulated to guide the investigation 
are presented below: 
6.1 Findings based on the subsidiary questions 
6.1.1 Research question 1 
What are the constraints that inhibit the successful realisation of public private 
partnership arrangementsfor the development of hydropower generationfacilities? 
A detailed literature review was undertaken to identify the constraints to the uptake and 
implementation of public private partnerships in the electricity sector of developing 
countries. Twenty three constraints outlined below were identified and are discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 2). These were broadly categorised under regulatory, legal, 
institutional, political and financial constraints as shown below: 
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A Regulatory 
i. Lack of an enabling regulatory frameworlc to support the participation of the private 
sector. 
ii. Weak regulatory frameworlc: lacking in clarity and ambiguous. 
iii. Slow implementation of power sector reforms. 
iv. Lack of independence of the regulatory body. 
v. Many requirements to obtain project approval. 
vi. Lengthy project approval process. 
vii. Restrictions on rate of return on investment. 
viii. Restrictions on the level of foreign ownership of comp~es. 
B Institutional 
ix. Poor coordination between government departments. 
x. Delays as a result oflengthy bureaucratic procedures. 
xi. Low level of skills of personnel involved with PPP. 
xii. Accusations of corruption and corrupt tendencies. 
xiii. Resistance from environmental groups. 
xiv. Resistance from civil society organisations. 
xv. Public resentment as a result of tariff increases. 
xvi. Investors concerns for need for intensive managerial resources. 
C Political 
xvii. Political Interference in procurement process 
xviii. Lack of political will and support. 
D Legal and Financial 
xix. Lack of enabling legal framework. 
xx. Failure of government to honour its contract obligations. 
xxi. Investors concerns of foreign exchange risk. 
xxii. Inability oflocal Institutions to provide equity financing. 
xxiii. Poor creditworthiness of power off-taker. 
6.1.2 Research question 2 
How do the constraints affect the development o/the public private partnerships? 
Similarly a synthesis of the literature review enabled the identification of the effect these 
constraints have on the development of the public private partnerships as: 
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i. Increased perception of country risk: by the private sector. 
ii. Increased exposure to foreign exchange risks as a result of the lack of readily 
available local financing. 
iii. Lengthy contract negotiations. 
iv. Increased transaction costs. 
v. Poorly formulated contracts and projects. 
vi. Contract cancellation or renegotiation. 
vii. Public resistance to the implementation of projects. 
viii. Failure to reach financial close of initiated projects. 
ix. Limited or no private sector participation. 
x. Slow implementation ofIndepend.ent power projects. 
6.1.3 Reselll'ch qllUtion 3 
How can the constraints be addressed? 
To facilitate this, the constraints identified were incorporated into a questionnaire and the 
survey conducted. The aim of the survey was to determine the importance in the Uganda 
electricity sector of the identified constraints to the development and implementation of 
public private partnerships. These constraints were ranked by stakeholders in the Uganda 
electricity sector with work experience on PPP projects. Data analysis was done using 
statistical tests as enabled by computer programme SPSS (Chapter 3). 
A response rate of 59.2% was obtained on the survey and the survey results revealed a 
consensus among the respondents perception as to the ranking in terms of importance of 
the identified constraints to the implementation of public private partnerships in the 
Uganda electricity sector. The top ten constraints in decreasing level of importance as 
perceived by the respondents are as follows: 
I. Inability of local institutions to provide equity financing 
2. Resistance from Environmental groups 
3. Poor coordination between Government departments 
4. Delays as a result of lengthy bureaucratic procedures 
5. Many requirements to obtain project approval 
6. Lengthy project approval process 
7. Political interference in procurement process 
8. Low level of skills of personnel involved with PPP 
9. Poor creditworthiness of power off-taker 
10. Resistance from civil society organisations 
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The following were perceived to be of less importance as constraints to the uptake and 
implementation of public private partnerships in the electricity sector. Starting with the 
least important: 
1. Restrictions to the level of foreign ownership of companies; 
2. Failure of government to honour its contract obligations; 
3. Lack of an enabling regulatory framework; 
4. Lack of enabling legal framework; 
5. Slow implementation of power sector reforms; and 
6. Lack of independence of regulatory body. 
A discussion of the survey results then enabled the synthesis of the following as the 
significant findings: 
i. Inability to . access local financing is the major constraint to the development of 
public private partnerships for the development of hydropower projects in Uganda. 
ii. Insufficient consideration by project promoters to environmental aspects of the 
project has been a significant reason for delay in uptake and implementation of 
public private partnerships in the electricity sector. 
iii. Lack of experience in the development and implementation of public private 
partnerships on the part of stakeholders has also hamstrung the development of 
PPPs in the electricity sector. This is further aggravated by lack of a stated policy 
on training of staff on the part of government. 
iv. There is a perception especially among the key players (private and government 
sector) in the development of PPPs that the procedural requirements are 
cumbersome, and unnecessarily lengthen the process. The situation is further 
exasperated by the many bureaucratic government departments the private sector 
has to deal with in the process; and 
v. However, regulatory and legal frameworks developed and being implemented are 
generally attractive to private sector participation in the electricity sector. 
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Strategies and measures suggested 
From the above findings, strategies and measures were suggested. The suggestion of theses 
strategies and measures was done with the view of remedying the most significant 
constraints identified by the respondents. It is in no way suggested that the other 
constraints are of lesser importance in the Uganda electricity sector nor that they are 
insignificant. The following were suggested as strategies and measure to facilitate faster 
uptake and implementation of Public private partnerships: 
1. Emphasis on environmental and social impact assessment during the project 
development phase with additional stress on the effective involvement of different 
stakeholders; 
2. Training of regulatory body and government sector in aspects of identification of 
suitable projects, incentivising the private sector, negotiation, financial evaluation 
and structuring of public private partnership projects; 
3. Development of practical experience through on job staff exchange programmes 
with units in other countries that are implementing public private partnerships; 
4. Creation of a unit within the regulatory body or ministry to specifically oversee the 
implementation of PPP projects; and 
5. Development of a process map to identify the requirements and roles of the public 
and private sector during the different stages of a public private partnership. 
6. Development of guidelines to the use of public private partnerships for 
infrastructural development in Uganda based both on country experience and 
international practise. 
6.2 Achievement of research objectives 
The research had five objectives namely; 
1. Identify the drivers for public private partnerships including the process of 
implementation. characteristics, propounded advantages and disadvantages of the 
partnerships 
2. To review literature on the Uganda electricity sector in order to identify the 
characteristics of demand, Supply of power, understand the institutional 
framework, organisational setup and the experiences so far in the implementation 
of Public Private Partnerships. 
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3. To identify imtitutional comtraints to the implementation of public private 
partnerships especially with regard to the development of hydro electricity 
generation capacity. 
4. Establish the relative importance of the identified constraints as perceived by the 
stakeholders involved in the development and implementation of public private 
partnership projects for hydropower generation facilities in the Uganda electricity 
sector 
5. Identify or propose measures and strategies through which the comtraints could be 
addressed 
The fIrst through to the third objectives have been achieved through the literature review as 
detailed in chapter two of this thesis. Importance of physical infrastructure for economic 
and social development, motivation for use of public private partnerships and constraints 
encountered in the implementation of public private partnerships in the electricity sector 
were discussed. Chapter two presented a discussion on the Uganda electricity sector. 
The fourth objective has been achieved through conducting the statistical tests enumerated 
in chapter three - methodology- and the results presented in chapter four- survey results of 
this thesis. 
The fIfth objective has been achieved through the fIndings and conclusions drawn from the 
survey result as reported in chapter four and the discussion presented in Chapter fIve. 
6.3 Research hypothesis 
The research has tested the hypothesis that institutional bottlenecks are comtraining the 
uptake and implementation of public private partnerships in the Uganda electricity sector. 
The hypothesis was explored through the literature review and the questionnaire survey as 
presented in chapter 2,4 & 5. 
Findings from the survey showed that the hypothesis was supported i.e. there are aspects 
discussed in chapter fIve of the institutional environments that were considered signifIcant 
constraints to the uptake and implementation of public private partnerships in the 




In an effort to bolster the hydropower generation capacity, the government of Uganda has 
driven initiatives intended to encourage private sector participation. These initiatives are 
manifested by the structural reforms that were undertaken in the sector culminating in the 
enacting of the Electricity Act 1999. However to date there has been limited private sector 
participation in the electricity sector with many proposed projects based on public private 
partnerships failing to materialise. This suggests that stakeholders have encountered a set 
of disincentives within the institutional environment that have proffered constraints thus 
stifling the growth of private sector investment and participation in the sector. The aim of 
the research was to establish the relative importance of identified constraints arising from 
the institutional environment in hamstringing the development and implementation of PPP 
in the electricity sector specifically in for hydropower generation facilities. This was done 
with the view of identifying what measures or strategies could be employed to mitigate the 
constraints. 
The findings from the research have established that despite the fonnulation of a regulatory 
framework that is perceived by stakeholders as being conducive for the fonnulation of 
public private partnerships in the electricity sector, structuring the financial package for the 
PPP poses the most significant constraint to the development and implementation of these 
collaborative ventures followed in significance by resistance to the proposed projects on 
environment grounds. In addition, these efforts are hampered by the numerous procedural 
requirements and bureaucratic processes project developers have to undertake exacerbated 
further by inexperienced personnel in the myriad of institutions they have to deal with 
during this process. 
To overcome these challenges, the research suggested a number of measures that included 
the training of personnel, stringent adherence to environmental and social impact 
assessment, creation of a PPP unit, the development of a process map for PPP 
implementation in the electricity sector and finally guidelines to the use PPP for 
infrastructural development. 
6.S Recommendations 
Further research effort is suggested in investigating the reasons for difficulty in structuring 
the financial package for public private partnerships for the development of hydropower 
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generation infrastructure in developing countries with a view of smoothing this aspect of 
the partnerships. 
Furthermore, an investigation should be undertaken to determine from the stakeholders as 
to what intervention method would be most appropriate to facilitate the speedy delivery of 
projects through public private partnerships. 
The research suggested the development of a process map for the implementation of public 
private partnerships in the electricity sector. It is recommended that research efforts be 
geared in this direction. The map should satisfactory encompass the requirements and 
expectations of all stakeholders in the development and implementation process. 
Finally. research effort should be expended towards the development of guidelines to the 
use of public private partnerships in Uganda. These efforts could begin with documenting 
the experiences with the development and implementation of these partnerships in the 
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Percent Percent Percent 
45.2 45.2 45.2 
14.3 14.3 59.5 
21.4 21.4 81.0 
11.9 11.9 92.9 
7.1 7.1 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cumu1ative 
Percent Pm:ent Percent 
45.2 45.2 45.2 
35.7 35.7 81.0 
9.5 9.5 90.5 
4.8 4.8 95.2 
2.4 2.4 97.6 
2.4 2.4 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent Percent 
47.6 47.6 47.6 
7.1 7.1 54.8 
40.5 40.5 95.2 
4.8 4.8 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent Percent 
40.5 40.5 40.5 
45.2 45.2 85.7 
4.8 4.8 90.5 
2.4 2.4 92.9 
7.1 7.1 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent Percent 
9.5 9.5 9.5 
90.5 90.5 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent Percent 
4.8 4.8 4.8 
2.4 2.4 7.1 
2.4 2.4 9.5 
90.5 90.5 100.0 
100.0 100.0 
Have you worked In another sector 
besides the e1ectr1dty sector 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Pen:ent Percent Percent 
Yes 32 76.2 76.2 76.2 
No 10 23.8 23.8 100.0 
Total 42 100.0 100.0 
Name or otber .ector besides the 
sector 
Valid Cumulative 
Freque.tK:Y Percent Percent Pen:ent 
Health 1 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Education 6 14.3 14.3 16.7 
Water 4 9.5 9.5 26.2 
Finance 9 21.4 21.4 47.6 
Legal 2 4.8 4.8 52.4 
Media 4 9.5 9.5 61.9 
TelecommuniCli 
1 2.4 2.4 64.3 tion 
ManufaI:turiDg 7 16.7 16.7 81.0 
Tnmsportation 1 2.4 2.4 83.3 
Non 7 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 42 100.0 100.0 
Have you prevleasly IDvolved with 
deveioDmeat or ppp 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Pen:ent Percent Percent 
Valid Yes 21 50.0 50.0 50.0 
No 21 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 42 100.0 100.0 
Name of sector 
Valid cumuJative 
Freque.tK:Y Pen:ent Percent Pen:eDt 
Valid Water 3 7.1 7.3 7.3 
Energy 12 28.6 29.3 36.6 
Housing 2 4.8 4.9 4l.S 
Tourism 17 40.5 4l.S 82.9 
Telecommunia 
2 4.8 4.9 87.8 tion 
Non 5 11.9 12.2 100.0 
Total 41 97.6 100.0 
Missing 77 1 2.4 
Total 42 100.0 
Reliability 
Scale Scale Corrected 
Mean Variance Item- Alpha 
if Item if Item Total if Item 
Deleted Deleted Correlation Deleted 
LACKREGU 65.8095 121.5726 .7585 .7976 
WEAKREGU 65.5000 125.3780 .5609 .8069 
SLOREFO 65.6429 121.9425 .6680 .8009 
REGINDEP 65.6429 134.9669 .2688 .8209 
REQUIREN 64.6667 127.6911 .4689 .8116 
LONGAPRV 64.7619 130.4785 .3851 .8159 
INVESCAP 65.5714 136.3484 .2367 .8220 
OWNCAP 66.1667 132.3374 .3936 .8156 
CORD POOR 64.5238 131.6702 .3622 .8169 
DELAY 64.5476 127.4245 .5658 .8077 
LOWSKIL 65.0000 130.8780 .4272 .8140 
CORUPTON 65.5000 132.9390 .3562 .8172 
ENVI RES I 64.3810 139.6562 .1097 .8266 
CSORESI 65.1905 139.1823 .0851 .8301 
PUBRESI 65.6190 139.5099 .0981 .8279 
INTMANAG 65.3095 134.4628 .4477 .8150 
PROCPOOR 64.9286 130.1167 .3828 .8161 
POLWIL 65.3571 132.3815 .3028 .8202 
LACLEGAL 65.7619 130.3322 .4424 .8133 
EXPORIA 66.0714 133.0436 .4398 .8144 
FORXCHGE 65.5714 136.4460 .2477 .8214 
NOLOCBAK 64.0476 134.0952 .3395 .8179 
CREDITOF 65.1429 136.8084 .2075 .8233 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of cases • 42.0 N of Items .. 23 
Alpha = .8231 
NParTests 
lIann-Wh1tney Test Government· Regulatory sector 
Ram 
WIII1ICind of 
orpniSlltion do )Q.I 
work f« 
Laclr: of an enabling regulatory fhunework Oovcnnent Body 
RlItJuIatory body 
Total 
Weak regulatory fhuneworlt lackinl in Govcrmcmt Body 
clarity and mnbiqaus RquIatory body 
ITotal 
Slow implemenlUioo of power sedor Body 
reforms body 
otal 
Laclr: of indqIen hw: from govcrmc:nt tBody 
inll.lrfimmce of rqpdatmy body body 
Total 
Manyrequimneola to obWn project Govcrmcmt Body 
approval ReguIato,ry body 
TOIaI 
I..q1by project approwI process Body 
body 
TOIaI 
Ratirictioaa 00 the mum on investmeot Oovcnnent Body 
ReguIato,ry body 
TOIaI 
Re$trictions to the 1m:1 of foreiJII Govcrment Body 
of companies Regulatory body 
TOIaI 
Poor (lO()fI\iMtion between Govcrmcmt Govcrment Body 
depu1m.ents Regulatory body 
TOIaI 
De .... rault of lengthy bul'Cllllllll'ali Oovcnnent Body 
procedures Regulatory body 
Total 
Low level of IIIdIla of pmaoonel Involved Oovcnnent Body 
withppp body 
Aecusatioos of corruption and conupt tBody 
tendeocies body 
Resistance from Environmental gtOUpII Govcrmcmt Body 
ReguIato,ry body 
TOIaI 
Resistance from Cillil society organisatiOllS Govcrment Body 
Regulatory body 
TOIaI 
Public resenlment aa a rault of tanif Oovcnnent Body 
increases ReguIato,ry body 
TOIaI 
Investors COIICCIlIS for intensive IIl8IIIIJeriaI Govcrment Body 
rIIIIOOrI:es on rebt1ive1y small projects Regulatory body 
TOIaI 
Inll.lrfimmce in procurement, contract Govcrment Body 
t.ende.rin& and evaluation process Regulatory body 
Total 
Lack of political will and support Govcrmcmt Body 
body 
Total 
Lack of enabling legal framework Oovcnnent Body 
Regulatory body 
Total 
Failure of sovament to honour its contract Oovenncmt Body 
obJisations RlItJuIatory body 
Total 
Investors concerns of 1breian excI!anse risk Govcrmcmt Body 
ie Slability ofUpndan c:urrency Regulatory body 
TOIaI 
I!tability of IocaIlnstitulions Cp provide Oovcnnent Body 
equity flJlllllcing Regulatory body 
TOIaI 




N McanRanlc Ranks 
19 13.13 249.50 
6 12.58 7S.SO 
2S 
19 14.11 268.00 
6 9.50 57.00 
2S 
19 13.74 261.00 
6 10.67 64.00 
2S 
19 11.89 226.00 
6 16.50 99.00 
2S 
19 14.50 275.50 
6 8.25 49.50 
25 
19 14.95 214.00 
6 6.83 41.00 
2S 
19 12.79 243.00 
6 13.67 82.00 
2S 
19 14.00 266.00 
6 9.83 59.00 
2S 
19 13.11 249.00 
6 12.67 76.00 
2S 
19 13.58 258.00 
6 11.17 67.00 
2S 
19 13.92 264.50 
6 10.08 60.50 
2S 
19 1234 234.50 
6 15.08 90.50 
2S 
19 12.32 234.00 
6 15.17 91.00 
25 
19 13.05 248.00 
6 12.83 77.00 
25 
19 13.24 251.50 
6 12.2S 73.50 
2S 
19 13.t3 • 249.50 
6 12.58 75.50 
25 
19 t1.61 22O.SO 
6 17.42 104.50 
2S 
19 11.66 221.50 
6 17.25 103.50 
2S 
19 13.50 256.50 
6 11.42 68.SO 
2S 
19 13.42 255.00 
6 11.67 70.00 
2S 
19 10.14 206.00 
6 19.83 119.00 
25 
19 11.74 223.00 
6 17.00 102.00 
25 
19 11.95 227.00 
6 16.33 98.00 
2S 
Lack of an enabling Weak regulatory Slow implementation Lack ofindependence Many requirementa to Lengthy project .Rmirictions on the 
regulatory framework framework lacking in of power sector from govcrment obtain project approval approval JlI'OI*s mum on investment 
clarity and ambiqouJ reforms illlelfele!1CII of 
regulatory body 
Mann-
WhitneyU 54.500 36.000 43.000 36.000 28.500 20.000 53.000 
W' 
75.500 57.000 64.000 226.000 49.500 41.000 243.000 
Z 
..0.173 -1.434 ..0.974 .1.451 .1.872 -2.456 ..0.288 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-taiIed) 0.863 0.152 0.330 0.147 0.061 0.014 0.773 
BxactSig. 
[2*(I-tailed 0.877 0.198 0.400 0.198 0.069 0.017 0.828 
Sig.)] 
Bxact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.964 0.169 0.441 0.169 0.065 0.017 0.839 
Euct Sig.(1 
tailed) 0.523 0.096 0.235 0.080 0.034 0.008 0.435 
Point 
Probability 0.174 0.042 0.085 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.062 
R.esUictiOllS to the leve Poor cootdinatiOD Delays IS a n:sult of Low level of akilla of AccusatiOllS of Resistance from Resistance from Civil Public 1'CIICIItDIeIIt IS a 
of foreign OWIIership 0 between OOvermeDt lengthy ~ucratic pensonncI Involved corruption I!Id corrupt Environmental groups society organisatiOllS result of tsrrif increases 
companies departments procedures withPPP tendencies 
Mann-
WhitDeyU 38.000 55.000 46.000 39.500 44.500 44.000 56.000 52.500 
WilcoxonW 
59.000 76.000 67.000 60.500 234.500 234.000 77.000 73.500 
Z 
-1.347 .0.131 .0.760 -1.168 .0.835 .o.rn .0.067 .0.308 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2.wled) 0.178 0.895 0.447 0.243 0.404 0.331 0.947 0.758 
ExactSig. 
[2*(I.wled 0.246 0.926 0.514 0.274 0.437 0.437 0.975 0.780 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.254 0.906 0.502 0.259 0.402 0.444 0.986 0.802 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.162 0.475 O.22S O.ISI 0.187 0.273 0.480 0.370 
Point 
Probability 0.123 0.020 O.03S 0.024 0.007 0.154 0.018 0.034 
Investors contcl'llS Cor Interference in Lack of political will LIck of enabling legal Failure of goven:tIImt to Investors concerns of Inability of local Poor creditworthiness 
intcnaive managerial pt'I)CIImDCIIt, contract and support framework honour its contract foreign exchange risk Institutions Ip provide of power offtaker 
resources on te1atively tcmdering and obligations Ie liability ofUgandan equity financing 
small projects evaluation process currency 
Maon-
WbitneyU 54.S00 30.S00 31.S00 41.S00 49.000 16.000 33.000 31.000 
Wi1coxonW 
1S.500 220500 221.S00 68.S00 10.000 206.000 223.000 221.000 
Z 
~.l13 -1.136 -1.131 ~.652 ~.S5S -2.183 ·1.623 ·1.325 
Asymp. Sis. 
(2-tailed) 0.863 0.083 0.083 0.515 0.519 O.OOS 0.105 0.185 
EDctSis. 
[2·( )-tailed 0.817 0.092 0.106 0.S5S 0.642 0.001 0.138 0.221 
Sig.)] 
EDctSig.(2 
tailed) 0.964 0.084 0.100 0.511 0.645 0.002 0.125 0.201 
Exact Sis. (1 
tailed) 0.523 O.OSO 0.048 0.2S1 0.321 0.002 0.078 0.088 
Point 
Probability 0.114 0.013 0.011 0.038 0.094 0.000 0.039 0.012 
NParTests 
Mann-Whitney Test Government - Private aector 
Rub 
WbatKmdof 
orpniaation do }'OO 
work for 
Lack of m enabling n.pIatoIy liamework Govemumt Body 
I'ri'n.te Company 
Tocal 
Weak reauJaImy fiamework lacking in Ooverrnenl Body 
clarity and lIIIbiqous Privare Company 
Tocal 
Slow implcmenllllion of power sector Oovennent Body 
reforms Privare Company 
Tocal 
Lack of independence &:om govennenl Ooverrnenl Body 
interference of regulatory body Private Company 
Tocal 
Many requircmenla to obtain project Govemuml Body 
-wrovaI Private Company 
Tocal 
l.en&thy project-wroval proce!III Oovennenl Body 
Private Company 
Tocal 
RcstirietioDa on !be retum on invatment Clovament Body 
Private Company 
Tocal 
Ratrictions to the level of futeign ownershiJ Govemuml Body 
of companies Privare Company 
Tocal 
Poor coordination between Govament Govemumt Body 
deplltlments Private Company 
Tocal 
Delays all a mult of lengthy bureaucratic Govemuml Body 
proecdures Private Company 
Tocal 
Low level of skills of pensonnellnvolved Govemuml Body 
wilhPPP Privare Company 
Tocal 
Accusations of COtTUption and COtTIIpI Clovament Body 
!tendencies Privare Company 
Tocal 
Resistance fioom Environmenlal groups Clovament Body 
Private Company 
Tocal 
Resistance from CivillllCiety organisations Oovennent Body 
Privare Company 
Tocal 
Public resentment all a mutt of tarrif Ooverrnent Body 
inc::n:aaea Private Company 
Tocal 
Inves1ml _ for inasM IIlIInII8Crial Clovament Body 
resources 011 relalively small projects Private Company 
Tocal 
Interference in procurement, contnlct Clovament Body 
ICIIdcring and evaluation proce!III I'ri'n.te Company 
Tocal 
Lack of political will and support Clovament Body 
Private Company 
Tocal 
Lack of enabling legal fiamework Oovennent Body 
Private CampIII)' 
Tolal 
Fu1ure of goverment to honour its COIlIraCt Clovament Body 
obligations Private Company 
Tolal 
Investon c:oncerns of foreign excbqe risk Clovament Body 
ic Slability ofUpodan cmrency Private Company 
Tolal 
Inability of JocaI Institutions Ip provide Clovament Body 
equity financing Privare Company 
Tocal 




N Mean Rank Raub 
19 12.21 232.00 
9 19.33 174.00 
28 
19 12.00 228.00 
9 19.78 178.00 
28 
19 11.97 227.s0 
9 19.83 178-'0 
28 
19 12.95 246.00 
9 17.78 160.00 
28 
19 13.63 259.00 
9 16.33 147.00 
28 
19 13.71 260.50 
9 16.17 145.SO 
28 
19 12.79 243.00 
9 18.11 163.00 
28 
19 12.47 237.00 
9 18.78 169.00 
28 
19 12.63 240.00 
9 18.44 166.00 
28 
19 13.39 254.50 
9 16.83 ISI.sO 
28 
19 14.03 266050 
9 1S.50 139.SO 
28 
19 13.84 263.00 
9 !S.89 143.00 
28 
19 14.87 282.S0 
9 13.72 123.50 
28 
19 14.37 273.00 
9 14.78 133.00 
28 
19 12.76 242.50 
9 18.17 163.50 
28 
19 14.13 268050 
9 15.28 137050 
28 
19 12.50 237050 
9 18.72 168.50 
28 
19 13.00 247.00 
9 17.67 159.00 
28 
19 13.63 259.00 
9 16.33 147.00 
28 
19 12.89 245.00 
9 17.89 161.00 
28 
19 11.97 227.50 
9 19.83 178.50 
28 
19 12.29 233050 
9 19.17 172.SO 
28 
19 14.68 279.00 
9 14.11 127.00 
28 
Lack of an enabling Weak regulatory Slow implementation Lack of independence Many requirements to Lcngtby project R.estirictions 011 the 
regulatory framework framework IIcldng in of power sector from goverment obtain project approval approval process mum on investment 
clarity and ambiqous reforms interfenmce of 
regulatory body 
Mann-
WhimeyU 42000 38.000 37.500 56.000 69.000 70.500 53.000 
WilcoxonW 
232.000 228.000 227.500 246.000 259.000 260.500 243.000 
Z 
-2.297 -2.439 -2.484 -1.588 -0.868 -0.784 -1.680 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 0.022 0.015 0.013 0.1l2 0.386 0.433 0.093 
EuctSig. 
[2*(I-tailed 0.033 0.019 0.016 0.156 0.438 0.468 0.117 
Sig.)] 
EuctSig.(2 
tailed) 0.3n 0.495 0.669 0.243 0.025 0.018 1.000 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.218 0.254 0.373 0.178 0.012 0.012 0.582 
Point 
Probability 0.182 0.029 0.214 0.118 0.008 0.009 0.203 
Page 1 of3 
Restrictions to the level Poor coordination Delays 81 a result of Low level of skills of Accuaations of Resistance from Resistance from Civil Public resentment 81 a 
of foreign ownership 0 between Govmnent lengthy bUreBUCI1Itic perssonnel Inwlved corruption and corrupt Environmental groups society organisations result oftarrifincreases 
companies departments procedures withPPP tendencies 
Mann-
WhitneyU 47.000 50.000 64.500 76.500 73.000 78.500 83.000 52.500 
WilcoxonW 
237.000 240.000 254.500 266.500 263.000 123.500 273.000 242.500 
Z 
-2.OS3 -1.828 -1.116 -0.469 -0.659 -0.384 -0.128 -1.761 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-talled) 0.040 0.068 0.265 0.639 0.510 0.701 0.898 0.078 
ExactSig. 
[2*(I-tailed 0.061 0.085 0.308 0.664 0.562 0.735 0.923 0.105 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.090 0.541 0.016 0.224 1.000 0.616 0.485 0.365 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.067 0.286 0.016 0.133 0.536 0.306 0.288 0.173 
Point 
Probability 0.043 0.091 0.010 0.052 0.058 0.118 0.004 0.043 
Pege2of3 
Investors concems for Interfemlce in Lade of political will Lack of enabling legal Failure of goverment to Investors COIlceml of Inability ofloeal Poor creditwortb.incu 
intensive managerial procurement, contract IIDd support ti'amework honour its contI'8tt foreign exchange riak Institutions tp provide of power offtllker 
resources OIl relatively ~deringand obligations ie stability ofUgandan equity fiJI8IICing 
small projects evaluation process currency 
Mann· 
WbitneyU 78.500 47.500 57.000 69.000 55.000 37.SOO 43.SOO 82.000 
268.500 237.S00 247.000 259.000 245.000 227500 233.SOO 127.000 
Z 
-0.364 -1.926 -1.477 -0.888 -1.621 -2.539 -2.235 -0.179 
Asy.mp. Sig. 
(2-tai1ed) 0.716 0.054 0.140 0.374 0.1 OS 0.011 0.025 0.858 
Exact Sig. 
[2*(I-tailed 0.73S 0.061 0.172 0.438 0.142 0.016 0.037 O.88S 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.377 0.488 0.032 0.423 0370 0.645 0.805 0.204 
Exact Sig. (1 
tailed) 0.218 0.26S 0.026 0.152 0.240 0.370 0.386 0.107 
Point 
Probability 0.182 0.026 0.008 0.061 0.101 0.218 0.041 0.029 
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Lack of an enabling Weak reguIatory Slow implementation Lack of indcpendc:oc:c Many requirements to Lengthy project RcstirictioDS on the 
regulatory framework framework lacking in of power sector from goverment obtain project approval approval process return on investment 
clarity and ambiqous manns interference of 
regulatory body 
Mann-
WbitneyU 16.500 22.000 2l.S00 18.500 5.000 4.500 27.500 
WilcoxonW 
22.500 212.000 27.500 208.500 11.000 10.500 217.500 
Z 
-1.243 .{I.6S9 .{I.72S -1.1 IS -2.334 -2.402 .{I.108 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 0.214 0.510 0.469 0.26S 0.020 0.016 0.914 
ExactSig. 
[2·(l-tailed 0.265 0.S86 0.523 0.356 0.021 0.014 0.929 
Sig.)l 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.377 0.495 0.669 0.243 0.025 0.018 1.000 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.218 0.254 0.373 0.178 0.012 0.012 0.582 
Point 
Probability 0.182 0.029 0.214 0.118 0.008 0.009 0.203 
Page 1 of3 
Restrictions to the leve Poor coordination Delays III a result of Low level of skilla of Accusations of Resistance from Resistance from Civil Public resentment III • 
offoreign ownership 0 between Govmnent lengthy bureaucnrtic pensonnel Involved corruption and corrupt Environmental groups society orpnisations result of tarrif increases 
companies departments procedures withPPP tendencies 
Mann-
WhitneyU 14.000 21.500 5.500 15.000 28.500 20.500 21.000 17.500 
WilcoxonW 
204.000 211.500 11.500 205.000 34.500 26.500 27.000 207.500 
Z 
-1.544 -0.693 -2.364 -1.355 0.000 -0.892 -0.751 -1.141 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-tailed) 0.122 0.488 0.018 0.176 1.000 0.372 0.453 0.254 
Exact Sig. 
[2·(l-tailed 0.191 0.523 0.021 0.226 1.000 0.464 0.523 0.308 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.090 0.541 0.016 0.224 1.000 0.616 0.485 0.365 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.067 0.286 0.016 0.133 0.536 0.306 0.288 0.173 
Point 
Probability 0.043 0.091 0.010 0.052 0.058 0.118 0.004 0.043 
Page 2 of3 
lnvestOIII concems for ID.terferc:nce in Lack of political will Lack of enabling legal F~of80~tm JnvestorlJ conccma of Jnability of local Poor creditworthiness 
intensive manaserial procurement, contract and support framework honour its contract foreign exchange risk InstItutiOlllIp provide of power oft\alcer 
resoun:es on relatively tendering and obligations ie stability ofUgandan equity financing 
small projects evaluation proce8II currency 
Mann· 
WhitneyU 16.500 21.000 8.500 19.000 18.S00 21.500 25.000 14.000 
WilcoxonW 
22.500 211.000 198.500 209.000 208.500 211.500 31.000 20.000 
Z 
·1.243 ..0.738 ·2.001 -1.027 -1.058 ..0.757 ..0.349 -1.455 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-tsiled) 0.214 0.460 0.045 0.304 0.290 0.449 0.727 0.146 
ExactSig. 
[2*( l-tailed 0.265 0.523 0.053 Q.408 0.356 0.523 0.787 0.191 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0377 Q.488 0.032 0.423 0.370 0.645 0.805 0.204 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.218 0.265 0.026 0.152 0.240 0.370 0.386 0.107 
Point 
Probability 0.182 0.026 0.008 0.061 0.101 0.218 0.041 0.029 
Peg.3of3 
NParTests 
Mann-Whltney Test Government - Energy 
.. ab 
What Kind of 
orpnisaIion do :you Sum of 
work«lr N M ...... R ... 1r It1IIIb 
Lack of In enabling regoIatory fraIneworIt Cloftnnent Body 19 lUI 213.00 
fessiooaI S 17.40 87.00 
Total 24 
Weak regoIatory fraIneworIt lacldng in Go'lmllCllt Body 19 11.74 2.23.00 
clarity and ambiq_ fessicma1 5 15.40 77.00 
Total 24 
Slow implemClll:ation of power sector <lovmncnt Body 19 214.50 
n'4Orms Energy professicma1 5 I 8S.50 
Total 24 I 
Lack ofindcpendence &om ~eat Oowrmcnt Body 19 I 209.00 
interfererlce of regulatory body I Energy professicma1 5 91.00 
Total 24 
Many requirements to obtain project Oovenneat Body 19 .2SO.00 
appnMl Energy profeuional 5 10.00 SO.OO 
Total 24 
Lengthy project approval process Go'lmllCllt Body 19 13.11 249.00 
-~ 5 10.20 Sl.00 Total 24 
Ratirictions cnlbe rdum on in1latlneat Oowrmcnt Body 19 12.05 2.29.00 
hsional 5 14.20 71.00 
Total 24 
RestrictioJIa to the level offoreign <lovmncnt Body 19 12.11 230.00 
of eompanies feuionaI 5 14.00 70.00 
Total 24 
Pcor coordination betwee!I GoYmneat OovennCllt Body 19 11.79 224.00 
departments feuionaI 5 15.lO 76.00 
Total 24 
Delays IS a mruIt of lengthy bw:eaucratic GovamentBody 19 12.24 232.50 
procedura hslonal 5 13.SO 67.50 
Total 24 
Low level of skills of perssonnellnvolved Oowrmcnt Body 19 11.63 221.00 
WithPPP feuionaI 5 15.80 79.00 I 
Total 24 
Aceusations of corruption and corrupt Oovennent Body 19 11.24 213.50 
tendencies hslonal 5 17.30 86.50 
Total 24 
Resistance from BnviromneDtal groups Oovmnent Body 19 12.84 l44.00 
feaIonal 5 11.20 56.00 
Total 24 
Resiatancc front CivIl scciely orpnisaIions Oowrmcnt Body 19 12.11 230.00 
fessicma1 5 14.00 70.00 
Total 24 
Public l1*:IItmeat IS a te8Ult of tarrif Oovenneat Body 19 1l.45 217.50 
increases fessicma1 5 16.SO 82.50 
Total 24 
Investors c:oncet'IIlI for intensi\'e managcriaI Oovmnent Body 
~ 
232.50 
resources on rdatively IIm&Il projects fessicma1 67.50 
Total 
Inlmference in procurement, contract Oovennent Body 19 10.26 195.00 
tendering Ind evaiuaticn process hsional 5 21.00 105.00 
Total 24 
Lack of political will and support Oovmnent Body 19 10.47 199.00 
hslonal 5 20.20 101.00 
Total 24 
Lack of enabling IegaI fmmework Oovennent Body 19 10.92 207.50 
feaIonal 5 18.SO 92.50 
Total 24 
Failure of go'ImIICIIt to honour its contract Cloftnnent Body 19 11.53 219.00 
obligations 5 16.20 81.00 
Total 24 
Investors concerns of foreign excbange risk Cloftnnent Body 19 10.95 208.00 
ic stabilily of Ugandan cunem:y bsional S 18.40 92.00 
Total 24 
Inability ofloeallnstitotiOllllIp provide Go'lmllCllt Body 19 11.74 223.00 
equity financing bslonal 5 15.40 77.00 
Total 24 
Poor creditworthiness of power ofllaker GovamentBody 19 11.95 
feaIonal 5 14.60 I 73.00 I 
Total 24 I I 
Lack of an enabling Weak regulatory Slow implementation Lack of independence Many requirements to Lqtby project RestirlctiODS on the 
regulatory framework framework lacking in of power sector ftom govcrmc:nt obtain project approval approval process return on investment 
clarity and ambiqous reforms interference of 
regulatory body 
Mann-
WbitneyU 23.000 33.000 24.500 19.000 35.000 36.000 39.000 
WUcoxonW 
213.000 223.000 214.500 209.000 50.000 51.000 229.000 
Z 
-1.873 -1.092 -1.736 -2.220 -0.928 -0.858 -0.649 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-tai1ed) 0.061 0.275 0.082 0.026 0.354 0.391 0.517 
Exact Sig. 
[2-( 1-tai1ed 0.088 0.331 0.103 0.044 0.406 0.446 0.581 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.092 0.257 0.114 0.019 0.347 0.433 0.528 
Exact Sig. (1 
tailed) 0.060 0.129 0.057 0.012 0.197 0.224 0.257 
Point 
Probability 0.045 0.004 0.026 0.002 0.027 0.025 0.010 
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Restrictions to the Ieve Poor coordination Delays 1\8 a result of Low level of skills of Accusations of Resistance from Resistance from Civil Public resentmeot 1\8 a 
of foreign ownership 0 between Goverment lengthy bureaucratic pensonnel Involved eomlption and eonupt Environmental groups society organisations result of larrifincreasC! 
companies departments procedures withPPP tendencies 
Mann-
WbltneyU 40.000 34.000 42.500 31.000 23.500 41.000 40.000 27.500 
WileoxonW 
230.000 224.000 232.SOO 221.000 213.500 56.000 230.000 217.SOO 
Z 
.o,s78 .0.999 .0.384 ·1.225 ·1.792 .0.519 .0.561 ·1.513 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-tai1ed) 0.563 0.318 0.701 21 0.073 0.604 0.575 0.130 
Exact Sig. 
[2*(I·tailed 0.629 0.367 0.731 0.088 0.679 0.629 0.160 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2 
tailed) 0.723 0.373 0.779 0.249 0.096 0.706 0.652 0.161 
Exact Sig. (I 
tailed) 0.340 0.203 0.437 0.149 0.049 0.353 0.321 0.069 
Point 
Probability 0.037 0.064 0.176 0.023 0.012 0.011 0.025 0.002 
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